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INTRODUCTION
Not since the Great Depression has there been such concern in the
popular press about the fundamental stability of the banking industry.
This apparent decline in public confidence stems from the unprece-
dented increase in the incidence of bank failures during the past dec-
ade. From 1946 to 1984 the average failure rate for banks was a
modest .07%, but from 1984 to 1987 this rate increased five-fold to
.37%.1 Although this failure rate is still quite small compared with the
failure rate for firms throughout the rest of the economy,2 the large
stake that the federal government has in the financial stability of banks,
and the widespread perception that healthy banks are especially impor-
tant to the economy, suggest that concern about the increasing inci-
dence of bank failures is warranted.3
The absolute number of bank failures is not particularly large.
One hundred twenty banks failed in 1985,4 145 failed in 1986,5 and 184
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1. Short, FDIC Settlement Practices and the Size of Failed Banks, Econ. Rev., Fed.
Reserve Bank of Dallas, March 1985, at 12, 12.
2. Id.
3. See Rosenberg & Given, Financially Troubled Banks: Private Solutions and Reg-
ulatory Alternatives, 104 Banking LJ. 284, 284 (1987) ("There are more banks in
trouble at present in the United States than there have been since the Great Depression
of the 1930s.").
4. Deposit Insurance Reform and Related Supervisory Issues: Hearings Before the
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failed in 1987.6 With nearly 15,000 commercial banks in the country,
unless there is some reason to be particulary concerned about banks as
distinct from other business entities, it is at least arguable that the cur-
rent rate of failure simply represents the healthy weeding out of weaker
operations in the face of more stringent competition in the financial
services industry. Indeed, the current level of bank failures pales in
comparison to that of the Depression, when some 9,000 banks sus-
pended operations. 7 Even during the roaring 1920s more than 500
banks failed in an average year.
This Article considers some causes and consequences of the cur-
rent rash of bank failures and proposes procedural reforms to deal with
the problem in ways that will strengthen the economy as a whole. Part I
argues that bank failures are a particular concern because the current
system of banking regulation imposes the costs of bank failures on the
general public. It is this regulatory system, rather than any notion that
banking institutions are peculiarly deserving of protection, that justifies
the special attention paid to bank failures.
Because any attempt to improve the procedures for dealing with
the bank failure problem must be sensitive to the sources of the prob-
lem, Part II examines the reasons why we observe bank failures in an
otherwise healthy economy. Fraud and self-dealing, insufficient asset
diversification, and fluctuations in the business cycle all have contrib-
uted to the recent high incidence of bank failure.
Using these reasons as background, the remainder of the Article
analyzes the role played by the legal system in coping with the problem
of bank insolvency, and concludes that a number of banking laws and
regulations actually increase the probability of bank failure.
Part III analyzes the procedures used by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and other administrative agencies to ad-
minister failed banks and evaluates the costs and benefits of alternative
regulatory schemes. This section concludes that the procedures most
popular with the regulatory agencies destroy much of the incentive of
depositors to monitor excessive risk taking by banks and thus make
bank failures more likely by eliminating an important constraint on
bank management.
Part IV describes the beneficial consequences that enhanced de-
positor monitoring would have on the banking system and identifies
brokered deposits as an additional cause for the low level of depositor
monitoring in the current system. Finally, Part V suggests that the inci-
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Pt. 2, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 237
(1986) (statement of L. William Seidman, Chairman, FDIC).
5. N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1987, at D17, col. 4.
6. Am. Banker, Jan. 5, 1988, at 1, col. 4. Nineteen additional banks would have
failed in 1987 but for regulatory assistance. Id.
7. Benston, Federal Regulation of Banking: Analysis and Policy Recommendations,
13J. Bank Res. 216, 225 (1983).
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dence of bank failure in the economy could be decreased if the proce-
dures governing the shift in control of a bank were amended. Such an
amendment would enhance the market for corporate control of banks
in order to expose bank management to monitoring by potential
acquirers.
I. THE CONCERNS ABOUT BANK FAILURES
Contrary to popular belief, the failure of an insured depository in-
stitution does not reflect a failure of the banking system as a whole or
even of the regulatory system that was constructed in the aftermath of
the wave of bank failures stemming from the collapse of the stock mar-
ket in 1929.8 As in other sectors of the economy, the failure of a finan-
cial institution indicates one of two things: either the firm has not
responded to market forces with a satisfactory mix of price and product
performance relative to its competitors in the industry or else the prod-
uct the firm is offering is not in sufficient demand by consumers to jus-
tify its production in the first place. In either case termination of the
firm's operations represents a net social gain. In a market economy,
when an enterprise fails, the resources previously devoted to a firm will
find other, more efficient uses.9 As a result, the existence of failing in-
stitutions may be a sign of health rather than a sign of malaise since it
indicates either that innovation is driving obsolete firms out of the in-
dustry, or that competition is driving inefficient firms out of the market.
These considerations suggest that in a developed market system bank
failure is not necessarily problematic. If there is a legitimate social con-
cern with bank failure, therefore, it must be because there is something
different about banks that alters our customary reliance on the valuable
economic role played by business failure. A number of bank-specific
concerns have been suggested: the fear of bank runs; the loss of soci-
ety's and depositors' wealth; and the costs of bank failure for the system
8. See Tussing, The Case For Bank Failure, 10 J.L. & Econ. 129, 143 (1967).
9. Indeed, there may well be a stronger case for allowing banks to fail. As financial
intermediaries, banks directly affect the allocation of financial resources by other firms.
As Professor Tussing notes
a financial intermediary has the potential not only for misusing the labor, in-
vested capital, and other factor inputs it uses directly, but also for distorting the
use of resources by business generally. If it is desirable that an inefficient man-
ufacturing establishment fail, so that the resources devoted to it can be made
more useful to society, it is doubly desirable that an inefficient bank fail. Not
only will the resources directly devoted to it find more useful outlets, but the
increased efficiency in financial processes which results can mean that loans are
made more nearly in accordance with social priorities, that local and regional
economic growth are not retarded by underbanking, and that interregional fi-
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of deposit insurance which itself is a response to perceived problems
with bank failures.
A. The Fear of Bank Runs
Perhaps the most common argument against allowing banks to fail
is that such failures cause bank runs which then lead to socially disrup-
tive waves of failures.10 This argument assumes that failures of inef-
ficiently managed banks impose negative external effects on sound
banks. In other words, any bank failure is of concern since the failure
of any one bank threatens harm to all banks. Proponents of this posi-
tion observe that the distinctive feature of banks as financial in-
termediaries is that banks typically have a higher proportion of their
liabilities in the form of demand or near-demand deposit accounts,
while their assets are in relatively illiquid mortgages and commercial
loans. 11 As a result of this asymmetry in the maturity structure of assets
and liabilities, no bank is able to pay off all depositors instantaneously.
If all or even a large percentage of the depositors suddenly demanded
withdrawal of their funds, the bank would face a severe crisis. It would
be forced to sell assets in order to meet the unanticipated liquidity de-
mands; if assets could not be liquidated quickly enough, the bank
would have to close until it could obtain sufficient liquidity. Even more
seriously, in the rush to obtain the necessary liquidity the bank would
have to sell off assets at "fire sale" prices or call in profitable loans.
The value of the bank as a whole would be reduced accordingly.
Normally, however, the balance sheet mismatch poses no problem.
Banks rely on the law of large numbers for assurance that on any given
day they will not be required to pay out more than a small fraction of
their deposit accounts. The reserves of liquid and near-liquid assets
that banks keep on hand are more than sufficient in normal circum-
stances to cover depositors' demands. That banks are technically un-
able to honor their promises to pay out all depositors "on .demand" is
ordinarily of no concern to anyone.
The mismatch between deposits and liabilities does become a
problem, however, in the unusual situation of a bank run. Bank runs
are essentially a collective-action problem among depositors. Deposi-
tors as a whole are much better off if large numbers of them do not
10. E.g., Garten, Banking on the Market: Relying on Depositors to Control Bank
Risks, 4 YaleJ. on Reg. 129, 160-63 (1986) (arguing that individual bank failures will
lead to economically disruptive bank runs).
11. This disparity, of course, may benefit bank customers. See Diamond & Dybvig,
Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. Pol. Econ. 401, 402 (1983) (banking
allows consumers to transform "illiquid assets into liquid liabilities" by pooling risk of
withdrawal to enable banks to invest in higher-yielding illiquid assets); see alsojacklin &
Bhattacharya, Distinguishing Panics and Information-Based Bank Runs: Welfare and
Policy Implications, 96J. Pol. Econ. 568 (1988) (examining the proposition that inter-
mediary contracts transform highly illiquid asset payoff streams into more liquid securi-
ties products).
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withdraw large sums simultaneously, since as noted above, sudden un-
anticipated withdrawals tend to reduce a bank's value-increasing the
probability that depositors will not be paid in full-and may force a
bank to close altogether. But if for any reason large unanticipated with-
drawals do begin at a bank, depositors as individuals will rationally con-
clude that they must do the same to avoid being left with nothing.
Thus, in a classic prisoner's dilemma, while depositors may collectively
be better off if they refrain from withdrawing their money from a bank
that is experiencing temporary liquidity problems, their inability to co-
ordinate their response to the problem will lead to a seemingly irra-
tional response- depositors will rush to be among the first to withdraw
their funds so that they can obtain their money before the bank's cash
reserves are drained. Thus a bank run begins.1 2
Banks, therefore, are classically subject to runs whereas other fi-
nancial intermediaries are not. Proponents of the "panic" justification
for bank regulation suggest that if a run can occur on a single bank, it
can occur on the banking system as a whole. If depositors see deposi-
tors in another bank rushing to withdraw their funds, and especially if
they see the other bank closing its doors rather than paying out, they
might conclude that their own institution is vulnerable to the same sort
of experience. The prisoner's dilemma could extend to the system as a
whole, resulting in economic catastrophe for the nation. This theory
finds empirical support in the events of the Great Depression when a
form of nationwide bank panic did indeed occur, forcing the govern-
ment to declare a bank holiday and eventually institute reform meas-
ures that constitute the fundamental structure of the bank regulatory
system today.
Despite the surface plausibility of this theory, it is unlikely that a
generalized bank panic like that which occurred during the Depression
would occur today. First, improvements in financial markets now per-
mit banks much greater leeway to match the duration of their assets and
liabilities, substantially mitigating the asset-liability mismatch in banks'
balance sheets. The development of a secondary mortgage market and
of mortgage-backed securities has allowed banks to reduce the average
maturities of their assets, and interest rate deregulation has given banks
the opportunity to attract longer-term liabilities through the sale of cer-
tificates of deposit. Banks are also earning a greater percentage of their
income through fee services rather than pure intermediation. These
marketplace developments, although driven by economic concerns
other than a desire to avoid bank runs, have partially mitigated many
banks' susceptibility to runs.
Second, the danger of pure "liquidity" runs-runs on economi-
cally solvent banks based on fears that the banks will be forced to sell
12. For a useful exposition see Fischel, Rosenfield & Stillman, The Regulation of
Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73 Va. L. Rev. 301, 307-10 (1987).
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off assets or close to meet liquidity demands-is substantially mitigated
by the Federal Reserve Board's readiness to provide emergency liquid-
ity assistance.13 If a run does develop on a healthy institution, the
Federal Reserve Board can supply short-term cash through the "dis-
count window" in order to allow the bank to pay depositors without the
need to liquidate assets at below-market prices.' 4
Third, the comprehensive system of federal deposit insurance
greatly reduces the danger of bank runs of all sorts-even those based
on a bank's actual financial condition.' 5 Depositors with accounts be-
low $100,000 know their funds are backed, at least de facto, by the full
faith and credit of the United States,' 6 so that weakness of their own
bank, much less that of other institutions, is no special cause for con-
cern. Deposit insurance, in the words of Milton Friedman and Anna
Schwartz, "has succeeded in achieving what had been a major objective
of banking reform for at least a century, namely the prevention of bank-
ing panics."' 7
The efficacy of the present system at preventing systematic bank
panic is attested to by the fact that the dramatic increase in bank fail-
ures in recent years has failed to bring about any significant loss of con-
fidence in the banking system itself.'8 The current absence of
generalized panic does not conclusively establish that one will not oc-
13. See 12 C.F.R. § 201.3(a) (1988).
14. See Tussing, supra note 8, at 144. Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz argue
that the most plausible cause of the wave of bank failures during the Depression was the
unwillingness of the Federal Reserve at the time to provide sufficient liquidity to solvent
institutions. See M. Friedman & A. Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States,
1867-1960, at 355-59 (1963).
15. Deposit insurance thus serves a function not unlike federal bankruptcy law, a
principal objective of which is to reduce collective-action problems outside the banking
industry. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 5963, 6180 (the automatic stay of actions against a debtor
in Chapter 11 prevents creditors "from acting unilaterally to gain an advantage over
other creditors"); see also Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements and the
Creditors' Bargain, 91 Yale LJ. 857 (1982) (explaining bankruptcy by using "creditors'
bargain" model).
16. It is unclear whether this continued depositor confidence stems from a belief
that the FDIC and the FSLIC actually have the resources to satisfy depositor demand in
the case that insolvency rates continue to grow at their current rate, or from a belief that
their deposits are backed by the full faith and credit of the United States. See Competi-
tive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 901, 1987 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News (101 Stat.) 552, 657 (1987) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2
U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., & 31 U.S.C.) (declaring it to be the "Sense of Congress"
that "deposits up to the statutorily prescribed amount in federally insured depository
institutions are backed by the full faith and credit of the United States").
17. M. Friedman & A. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 440.
18. Where federal deposit insurance is lacking, however, more generalized bank
runs are still possible, as evidenced by the minor panics that occurred during the early
1980s among state-chartered, non-federally insured thrifts in Maryland and Ohio. See
generally Miller, The Future of the Dual Banking System, 53 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1, 19
(1987) (describing disasters in state sponsored insurance funds in Maryland and Ohio).
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cur in the future, but it does support the inference that a generalized
panic is unlikely under present conditions. Disclosure of negative in-
formation about certain banks does not "spillover" to other banks caus-
ing general disruption because the market is able to distinguish the
firm-specific financial problems that affect individual banks from the in-
dustry-wide problems that affect banks generally. 19 Indeed, there is no
evidence of any spillover effect from the recent abundance of bank fail-
ures, including such large failures as that of Continental Illinois.20
B. Loss of Depositors' and Society's Stock of Wealth
A second argument for granting special regulatory treatment to in-
solvent banks (and for society's apparent low tolerance for bank fail-
ures) depends on the alieged lack-of sophistication on the part of
depositors coupled with the importance of demand and time deposits2 '
as a stock of wealth. According to this line of reasoning, the owners of
bank deposits lack the expertise and sophistication to make informed
decisions about which financial institutions can provide safe havens for
their savings.2 2 Thus, it is said, the government should provide special
regulatory protections to prevent the loss of wealth stemming from
bank failure.
This argument, however, does not support special regulatory treat-
ment for banks. First, the premise that depositors will be unsophistica-
ted in their choice of a bank in which to place their savings is doubtful
today. There is little reason to suppose that depositors are any less
19. Macey & Garrett, Market Discipline by Depositors: A Summary of the Theoreti-
cal and Empirical Arguments, 5 YaleJ. on Reg. 215, 234 & n.79 (1988).
The fact that the market value of similar banks does not decline when an individual
bank fails is strong evidence of a lack of a spillover effect since it indicates that the bank
failure has not even raised the cost of capital of the other banks. See Murphy, Disclosure
of the Problem Bank Lists: A Test of the Impact, 10J. Bank Res. 88, 92 (1979) (showing
that disclosure of the fact that certain banks were in trouble did not affect market value
of other banks).
20. G. Kaufman, Implications of Large Bank Problems and Insolvencies for the
Banking System and Economic Policy 12 (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Staff Memo-
randum No. 85-3, 1985) (Bank runs do not take the form of currency drains out of the
system, but of "redeployment of deposits to other, presumably less risky banks of similar
characteristics. A run on a bank no longer translates into a run on the banking system
21. Examples of time deposits are passbook savings accounts and certificates of
deposit.22. The argument that depositors have sufficient expertise and sophistication to
make informed decisions about which financial institutions to entrust with their money
presupposes that depositors can obtain sufficient information upon which to bring their
expertise and sophistication to bear. It is clear that such information is readily available.
As one commentator has observed, "information about the operations and financial con-
dition of banks, particularly large institutions, already is surprisingly comprehensive,
readily available, and, in the view of the professional analysts who use it, equal to or
better than disclosure currently available about other industries." Garten, supra note
10, at 140 (citations omitted).
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sophisticated in their choice of a bank in which to invest than in their
other financial decisions, such as the choice of a mutual fund or individ-
ual retirement account.23 The vigorous price competition that broke
out when deposit interest rates were deregulated suggests that consum-
ers are quite sophisticated about their investment in financial institu-
tions, at least as far as the return features of their investments are
concerned. There is good reason to suppose that depositors would be
equally sophisticated about the risks of their investments in banks.
Second, even if depositors are somehow unsophisticated, the dan-
ger of bank failure would not threaten society's stock of wealth. During
the Depression, when 9,000 banks failed or suspended operations, de-
positor losses amounted to only $1.3 billion, a figure that pales in com-
parison to the $85 billion in losses borne by holders of common and
preferred stock over the same period.2 4 Bank failures simply do not
threaten to destroy society's stock of wealth, nor do they threaten to
wipe out all of the savings of those depositors who place their money at
banks that fail.25
Furthermore, it is not at all obvious why a bank failure is any more
disruptive to the economy than the failure of an industrial enterprise.26
23. As with financial return, information about bank riskiness will be contained in
the rates of interest that banks must pay to obtain funds from depositors who are willing
to risk making deposits above the $100,000 insurance ceiling. See infra note 107 (dem-
onstrating that interest rates increase with riskiness).
24. M. Friedman & A. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 351; Tussing, supra note 8, at
145.
25. While bank failures do not appear to threaten to destroy society's stock of
wealth, those people who hold a disproportionate share of their wealth in the form of
bank deposits will suffer disproportionately in the case of bank failure, just as those who
hold a disproportionate share of their wealth in the stock market lose disproportionately
when the stock market crashes.
But even a person with one hundred percent of her assets in a bank that fails will
not lose all of her assets in the event of a bank failure. In the worst case, the assets of the
bank will be liquidated, and the depositor will share pro rata with other creditors in the
distribution of those assets. Historically, depositors have recovered a very high percent-
age of their assets in the event of failure. George Kaufman examined depositor losses
from bank failures before the introduction of the FDIC (from 1865 through 1933) and
found that 82 percent of the losses borne by failed banks came from liquidation of assets
(62 percent) and from shareholders' equity (20 percent). This means that only 18 per-
cent (a total of 2.2 billion out of total losses of 12.3 billion) were borne by depositors.
Most important, depositors' losses were only .21 percent of total deposits. G. Kaufman,
supra note 20, at 5.
It is also true, however, that the segment of the population with deposits of less
than $100,000 is most likely to have a disproportionate share of its wealth in bank de-
posits. This is a strong argument for insuring small deposits, so that such people, who
are less able to diversify their savings, will have some form of completely safe investment
that still can be reinvested by intermediaries such as banks.
26. The willingness of the federal government to bail out a large industrial enter-
prise such as Chrysler suggests that the federal bailout of major banks may not be partic-
ularly anomalous. There are at least two responses to this. First, as argued earlier,
insolvencies serve the valuable economic functions of weeding out poorly run firms,
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When banks fail, depositors may lose their money if their deposits are
not insured. When other firms fail, these same depositors lose their
jobs, which of course amounts to much the same thing. Although it is
sometimes argued that bank failures may disrupt the payments sys-
tem, 2 7 it is unlikely that anything short of a massive wave of failures
would have any significant adverse effects on that system. 28 Finally,
under the current regulatory structure in which bank customers with
deposits of $100,000 or less are insured by the FDIC, the argument
that banks should not be allowed to fail because unsophisticated depos-
itors will be harmed carries even less weight.29
Upon closer inspection, the argument that insolvent banks must be
kept open because of the critical role they play as financial in-
termediaries in investing the nation's stock of wealth turns into an ar-
providing that capital is allocated to its highest valuing users, and ensuring that vigorous
product-market competition will provide customers with high quality products at com-
petitive prices. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text(discussing the positive role
that business failures play in the economy). The positive role of insolvency implies that,
from a policy perspective, government bailouts of failing firms are not usually desirable.
Rather, the consequences of each bailout decision must be analyzed and justified inde-
pendently.
Second, there are important differences among various types of bailouts. As argued
in a subsequent section of this Article, it would be possible to protect (or "bail out")
small depositors of failed banks while still retaining the salient disciplinary features of
insolvency. See infra notes 136-151 and accompanying text (discussing bank failure
policies). In other words, the issue really is not whether banks should be allowed to fail,
but rather which classes of claimants should be protected when insolvency occurs. Thus
the bank failure situation differs dramatically from the Chrysler insolvency because there
was an independent policy judgment made that Chrysler-as a large employer and a
major defense contractor-should not be allowed to fail. By contrast, in the bank failure
situation, nobody has yet argued that a particular bank should be kept open because it
serves some unique social role in the national economy due to the fact that it was heavily
involved in defense contracting. Indeed, the existence of the Federal Reserve Board,
twelve powerful regional federal reserve banks, and 15,000 independent commercial
banks, suggests that no individual bank has the same niche in the banking industry that
Chrysler had in the automotive and defense industries. Thus the federal bailout of
Chrysler does not serve as a useful precedential model for insolvent U.S. banks.
27. See Corrigan, Are Banks Special?, in Annual Report, 11-12 (Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis, 1982).
28. G. Kaufman, supra note 20, at 12.
29. If regulatory agencies delay making payments to insured depositors, such de-
positors may suffer unnecessary losses. If such depositors are unable to make timely
interest payments on secured obligations such as home mortgage payments, such losses
may be quite large. But the importance of making prompt payouts to insured depositors
of failed banks long has been recognized. See Preston, The Banking Act of 1935, 43 J.
Pol. Econ. 743, 750 (1935).
When a bank fails and the FDIC liquidates the institution, insured depositors typi-
cally are paid off within forty-eight hours of the insolvency. 'Interview with officials from
the Division of Bank Supervision, Failing Bank and Assistance Transactions Section, Of-
fice of the General Counsel of the FDIC, and Office of the Chairman of the FDIC (Dec.
8, 1986) [hereinafter Interview]. To its credit, the FDIC takes great pride in its ability to
make payoffs to insured depositors quickly. Id. (emphasizing ability of FDIC to handle
large bank failures without disruption in depositors' access to funds).
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gument in favor of permitting banks to fail. Clearly a bank that makes
improvident investment decisions is more likely to fail than a bank that
makes sound investment decisions. Barring the misappropriation of
funds by management, the reason banks fail is that they loan money to
people and companies who cannot pay it back. When banks make such
bad investment decisions, the damage is felt not only by those who have
invested in the bank, but throughout the entire economy, because of
the opportunity cost of the bad investment decisions. Each dollar com-
mitted by a bank to an improvident borrower is a dollar that could have
been invested in a socially desirable venture. Banks, as financial in-
termediaries, have the potential for a double impact on the efficient use
of resources. Not only can they misuse such resources as labor and
capital themselves, but they can distort the allocation of these resources
to other end-users. Allowing failures, then, could actually improve the
prospects for increasing society's stock of wealth.30
C. The Real Source of Concern: The Regulatory Costs of Bank Failures
The principal attribute that makes banks "special" is the asymme-
try between assets and liabilities that exacerbates the collective-action
problem facing depositors and leads to the threat of bank runs on
healthy banks. In our economy the implementation of deposit insur-
ance has addressed this problem. The administration of deposit insur-
ance, however, poses a regulatory cost of its own-it gives the
shareholders and the managers of insured banks incentives to engage
in excessive risk taking because the people who stand to benefit if the
risks pay off (bank shareholders) are able to allocate some of their
losses to innocent third parties.
Thus, bank failure is of legitimate concern because the costs of
bank failures fall on third parties. These third parties are the healthy
banks whose contributions to the FDIC and Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) insurance funds pay off depositors of
failed banks, and ultimately the federal taxpayers whose funds replen-
ish the federal insurance funds when they are depleted.
A fundamental contribution of modem corporate finance has been
to formalize the nature of the conflict within the modern, publicly held
corporation between the interests of holders of fixed claims and the
interests of shareholders who hold the residual claims on the firm's
wealth. Among any particular set of asset allocation decisions, any in-
vestment strategy that increases risk will transfer wealth from the fixed
claimants to the residual claimants. Indeed, shareholders-who influ-
ence corporate decisions through their voting power-can even enrich
themselves at the expense of the fixed claimants by shifting assets to
risky investments that drive down the total value of the firm. A simple
30. Tussing, supra note 8, at 146.
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example illustrates how this can happen.3'
Suppose that a bank has total assets of $1,000, of which $500 rep-
resents liabilities to depositors and $500 represents shareholders' eq-
uity. The bank has the option of investment strategy A that has an
expected payoff of $1010 or investment strategy B that has an expected
payoff of only $960.
INVESTMENT A:
MONETARY RETURN EXPECTED VALUE
PROBABILITY / FIRM DEPosrrORS COMMON / FIRM DEPOsrrORS COMMON
.1 $ 500 $500 $ 0 $ 50 $50 $ 0
.8 1000 500 500 800 400 400
.1 1600 500 1100 160 50 110
1.0 $1010 $500 $510
INVESTMENT B:
MONETARY RETURN EXPECTED VALUE
PROBABILITY / FIRM DEPOSITORS COMMON / FIRM DEPOSITORS COMMON
.4 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0
.2 1000 500 500 200 100 100
.4 1900 500 1400 760 200 560
1.0 $960 $300 $660
If the bank selects investment strategy A, there is a ten percent
probability that the strategy will cause the firm to have a net worth of
$500, an eighty percent probability that the investment will cause the
firm to have a net worth of $1000, and a ten percent probability that the,,
investment will cause the firm to have a net worth of $1600. Invest-
ment strategy A poses no risk of loss to depositors. Even under the
worst possible scenario, in which the bank receives a return of only
31. The example used here was adopted, with several alterations, from a similar
example contained in Professor William A. Klein's now classic work, Business Organiza-
tion and Finance: Legal and Economic Principles 223-24 (1980). We are grateful for
his permission to tinker with his presentation.
The term "monetary return" in the text refers to the actual net return that the firm
will receive under alternative contingencies in the future. So, for example, investment
strategy A has three possible outcomes. If the firm employs strategy A, it will receive the
present value of either $500, $1000, or $1600 at some point in the future. Which of
these payoffs it receives depends on the outcome of certain contingencies. While the
outcome of these contingencies is currently unknown, we can estimate the probabilities
that they will occur. Under this hypothetical, there is a ten percent chance that the firm
will receive a payoff of $500, an eighty percent chance that the firm will receive a payoff
of $1000, and a ten percent chance that the firm will receive a payoff of $1600 (these
probabilities of course sum to 100 percent). The "expected value" is calculated by mul-
tiplying the monetary return of a particular contingency by the probability that that re-
turn will be realized. A risk-neutral investor will value an investment that provides an
expected return of $50 at $50.
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$500, the depositors will be fully paid because their claim on the assets
of the bank comes before that of the shareholders.
Alternatively, if the bank embarks on investment strategy B, there
is a significant probability (forty percent) that the bank will fail. Obvi-
ously, the depositors prefer strategy A to strategy B; they are holders of
fixed claims so they do not share in the greater potential "upside" pay-
off of strategy B, and they prefer the certain payoff that strategy A af-
fords. From the depositors' perspective, a decision to opt for
investment strategy B means greater default risk and significantly lower
net expected return ($300 as against $500 under strategy A). By con-
trast, this strategy holds the promise of a much greater return for the
common shareholders, who, as residual claimants, reap the gain of in-
vestment B's greater upside potential. Therefore, even though there is
a greater probability that the shareholders will be wiped out entirely,
the shareholders unambiguously will prefer strategy B.
The expected monetary value to shareholders under strategy B is
$660 as opposed to $510 under strategy A. By employing strategy B,
the shareholders receive an expected monetary gain of eighteen per-
cent, which comes at the expense of the depositors. To make things
worse, under the example posited above, the dominant strategy from
the shareholders' perspective diminishes the total value of the bank.5 2
In the publicly held corporation, the problem of excessive risk tak-
ing is mitigated to a significant extent by two factors. First, various de-
vices serve to protect fixed claimants against excessive risk taking.
Corporate lenders typically insist on protection against actions by cor-
porate managers that threaten their fixed claims.53 Second, risk taking
is reduced to some extent because managers are not perfect agents of
risk-preferring shareholders. Managers are fixed claimants to that por-
tion of their compensation designated as salary. In addition, manage-
rial incentives for risk taking are reduced since managers have invested
their non-diversifiable human capital in their jobs. This capital would
depreciate significantly in value if their firms were to fail.
The second risk-reducing factor-that managers tend to be more
risk-averse than shareholders-is present for commercial banks as well
32. The conflict between risk-averse fixed claimants (depositors) and risk-prefer-
ring residual claimants (shareholders) outlined above is not peculiar to banks. Design-
ing mechanisms for resolving these sorts of conflicts (and conflicts between
shareholders and managers) constitutes the core of the subject of corporate finance.
Preferred stock, convertible bonds, and bond indentures can all be understood as mar-
ket-driven mechanisms for controlling excessive risk taking by shareholders. See Smith
& Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. Fin. Econ.
117 (1979).
33. The restrictions on managerial behavior that lenders obtain from borrowers
can be divided into four categories: restrictions on production or investment decisions,
restrictions on dividend payments, restrictions on the obtaining of additional financing,
and restrictions controlling the forms that the borrower's repayment to creditors can
take. See id. at 125-47.
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as other corporations. What makes banks fundamentally different from
other types of firms, however, is the lack of significant discipline from
other fixed claimants. FDIC insurance removes any incentive that in-
sured depositors have to control excessive risk taking because their
funds are protected regardless of the outcomes of the investment strat-
egies that the banks select: In a world without deposit insurance, de-
positors would demand that banks refrain from engaging in risky
investment strategies or else would demand that they be compensated
in the form of a higher interest rate for the extra risk. Thus, depositors
of insured financial institutions cannot be expected to exert the same
degree of restraints on excessive risk taking as other fixed claimants,
and this enhances the degree of influence exerted by shareholders,
whose preference is to assume high levels of risk.34
Although deposit insurance generally achieves its purpose of
preventing bank runs, it does so at the cost of providing incentives for
excessive risk taking by banks. This excessive risk taking leads in turn to
a greater risk of bank failure. Methods devised for dealing with the
problem of bank failures must therefore be sensitive to the concern that
the current structure of banking regulation creates incentives for exces-
sive risk taking.
II. THE SOURCE OF BANK FAILURES
The bank regulatory system is not unaware of the problem of ex-
cessive risk taking created by deposit insurance; indeed, much federal
banking regulation is designed with the express purpose of limiting
bank risk. Minimum capital requirements, 35 restrictions on banks' in-
vestment banking activities,3 6 lending limits, 3 7 and limitations on bank
holding company activities 38 are all justified on the ground that they
reduce the incidence of bank failure by limiting the ability of banks to
engage in risky ventures or by preventing them from becoming too
highly leveraged. This complex structure of regulation is backed up by
a system of bank inspection designed to detect and correct excessive
risk taking before it places a bank in jeopardy.3 9
34. Other fixed claimants, such as trade creditors, other banks that participate in
the interbank federal-funds market, and holders of subordinated or senior debt securi-
ties, do not in general act as adequate substitutes for monitoring by uninsured deposi-
tors. This is because, with the exception of holders of subordinated or senior debt
securities, these other claimants extend credit only on an extremely short-term basis. In
addition, federally insured depository institutions simply do not have subordinated or
senior debt securities in their capital structure.
35. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 12 C.F.R. § 225 app. A,
at 92 (1988) (Capital Adequacy Guidelines for Bank Holding Companies and State
Member Banks).
36. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 378(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
37. Id. § 84 (1982).
38. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843 (West 1980 & Supp. 1988).
39. See 1 M. Malloy, The Corporate Law of Banks § 1.3 (1988).
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With all of these restrictions in place, one may wonder where the
weak points in banking regulation are located. A useful starting point
for such an analysis is to define the optimal regulatory regime. The
optimal regulatory mix would be designed so as to maximize the differ-
ence between (1) the social costs of bank failure in the absence of regu-
lation, and (2) the sum of (a) the social costs of the bank failures that
occur with regulation plus (b) the social costs of the regulation itself, in
the form of reduced flexibility and efficiency of banking operations. As
will be seen, certain regulatory policies may be open to question on this
score.
Banking regulation-and FDIC policies concerning bank clo-
sures-should be sensitive to the causes of bank failure since the ulti-
mate success of such policies will depend on whether they can reduce
or eliminate the adverse incentives necessarily created by the imple-
mentation of deposit insurance and other bank safety regulations. In-
stead, bank regulations are designed to prevent bank failures. But even
here, the regulations increase rather than reduce the likelihood of such
failures. The remainder of this section examines the causes of bank
failures in order that bank failure policies may be examined on their
own terms. Analytically, bank failures can be divided into three catego-
ries: (1) those that result from fraud and self-dealing on the part of
management; (2) those that result from insufficient asset diversification;
and (3) those that result from severe cyclical variations in the business
cycle.
A. Fraud and Self-Dealing
It has been estimated that fraud and self-dealing transactions are
"apparent" in as many as one-third of today's bank failures.40 Such
behavior, of course, is a possibility in any large firm since it is not possi-
ble or efficient for owners to monitor all employees at all times. These
sorts of problems are particularly acute in financial institutions, how-
ever, because of the large portion of their assets held in highly liquid
form. Nonetheless, there seems to be a higher incidence of fraud-re-
lated insolvencies in the banking industry than in other, similar forms
of business such as insurance and investment banking.4 '
The same regulatory structure that creates a problem of excessive
risk taking by banks also leads to a reduction in the normal levels of
monitoring within the firm and thus also may lead to a higher incidence
40. Remarks by R.L. Clarke, The Exchequer Club, Washington, D.C., printed in
Comptroller of the Currency News Release NR 88-5, at 6 (Jan. 20, 1988).
41. Probably due to obvious documentation problems, we have no empirical sup-
port for the proposition that there is a higher incidence of fraud-related problems in
banks than in other institutions. It is clear, however, that the correlation of bank failure
and fraud is high and that "[p]roblems of insider abuse or fraud were often related to
lack of oversight and controls." Comptroller of the Currency, An Evaluation of the Fac-
tors Contributing to the Failure of National Banks 4 (1988).
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of bank failures due to fraud. Not only does the protection afforded by
the FDIC remove any incentive for insured depositors to control exces-
sive risk taking, it also removes their incentive to monitor in order to
reduce the incidence of fraud and self-dealing.
Shar-eholders have an incentive to monitor to prevent fraud and
self-dealing in banks, but shareholder monitoring is notoriously ineffec-
tive in many cases because individual shareholders rarely have sufficient
incentives to engage in monitoring due to collective-action problems.42
Outside the banking setting, fraud and self-dealing are monitored by
fixed claimants and preferred shareholders through contractual de-
vices, and by lenders' regular oversight of the affairs of their borrowers.
One might argue that FDIC insurance simply replaces one set of
creditors-depositors-with another set of creditors-state and federal
regulators. These other creditors might appear more financially so-
phisticated than rank and file depositors and thus in a better position to
conduct the monitoring necessary to prevent bank fraud. This conten-
tion is supported by the authority that both federal and state regulators
have to require periodic reports from banks and to conduct on-site in-
spections of bank premises. 43
The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council was
formed in 1979 to develop a standardized system for examining banks
and measuring bank performance. The major innovation of the
Examination Council has been the adoption of a uniform rating system
(generally referred to by the acronym CAMEL) for evaluating banks.44
42. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 Am. Econ. Rev.
650, 653 (1984). Depositors face the same collective-action problems that burden
shareholders when called upon to monitor fraud and self-dealing by bankers. The col-
lective-action problems of fixed claimants such as depositors can be mitigated in a
number of ways. First, rating agencies such as Moody's and Standard and Poor's pro-
vide continuous monitoring of management. Second, a credible promise by a bank to
make frequent trips to the capital markets will ensure periodic monitoring of manage-
ment by the investment banking community. Id. Third, indenture trustees, who repre-
sent the interests of an entire group of fixed claimants, provide still another layer of
monitoring. Smith & Warner, supra note 32, at 148-52. Finally, holders of fixed claims
can require that debtors solve their collective-action problem for them by mandating
that financial reports be prepared by independent auditors.
These various mechanisms for solving the collective-action problems that face both
shareholders and fixed claimants are likely to be more useful to fixed claimants than to
shareholders because shareholders, as residual claimants, are not simply concerned with
ensuring the return of a stated sum of principal and interest, but with the more amor-
phous problem of maximizing firm value. These independent agencies are unlikely to
be as competent at determining whether a firm is engaging in profit maximizing ven-
tures as they are in deciding whether the firm is acting in ways consistent with the more
modest interests of the fixed claimants.
43. See 1 M. Malloy, supra note 39, at § 3.1.
44. The letters in the word "CAMEL" represent the following factors that regula-
tory agencies take into account when assessing bank risk: (C)apital adequacy, (A)sset
quality, (M)anagement ability, (E)arnings, and (L)iquidity. E. Symons &J. White, Bank-
ing Law: Teaching Materials 572-74 (2d ed. 1984).
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Upon the discovery of a fraudulent banking practice-or indeed of a
practice that regulators deem to be "unsafe or unsound"-the appro-
priate regulator may order the activity terminated.45 Courts have de-
termined that the term "unsafe banking practice" may be liberally
construed to give the relevant bank regulator discretion to correct per-
ceived problems in their infancy.46 In addition to the normal cease and
desist powers, bank regulators may direct bank managers, employees,
and their agents to take specific, positive steps to correct any problems
discovered during the examination process.47 Bank regulators also
have the authority to remove officers and directors from their posts
under appropriate circumstances, 48 and the FDIC has the authority to
revoke a bank's depositor insurance if necessary. 49 Thus, the problem
with the current system, which substitutes government regulators for
private sector creditors as the primary monitors of bank activity, is not
that the regulators lack the administrative authority to do an effective
job.
Nevertheless, replacing private-sector creditors with public-sector
regulators as the first line of defense against bank fraud and self-deal-
ing presents two problems. 50 First, private-sector creditors have far
greater incentives than public-sector regulators to monitor closely for
fraud and self-dealing. Because the creditor's own money is on the line,
they will monitor until the losses avoided from such monitoring equal
the marginal cost of such activity. In addition, if a competitive market
for bank services exists, those bankers who can develop mechanisms for
providing depositors and creditors with credible assurances that they
will refrain from fraudulent activities will thrive at the expense of their
competitors.
The second reason there may be a social cost to displacing private-
sector regulators is that, not surprisingly, the public sector simply has
not manifested a willingness to bear the enormous costs of continu-
ously monitoring the nation's 15,000 FDIC-insured depository institu-
tions. Under current regulatory policies, "banking agencies ordinarily
do not begin to focus extra attention on a bank" until a bank's CAMEL
rating reaches three.5 1 For a bank to obtain such a rating it must be
45. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (1982).
46. See I M. Malloy, supra note 39, at § 1.3.3 (noting that "there has been surpris-
ingly little reported litigation involving challenges to the FDIC's" power to terminate
deposit insurance due to unsafe and unsound banking practices of the insured, and at-
tributing the lack of litigation to the fact that "the FDIC's decisions in this regard have
been viewed as committed to its discretion").
47. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (1982); 1 M. Malloy, supra note 39, at § 1.3.3. See
generally Galbraith & Seidel, FDIG vs. Imprudent Banking Officials: The Enforcement
Apparatus, 104 Banking LJ. 92 (1987) (analyzing FDIC enforcement proceedings).
48. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e) (1982).
49. Id. § 1818(a).
50. See supra note 42; Macey & Garrett, supra note 19, at 225.
51. See E. Symons &J. White, supra note 44, at 574.
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found to be "in significant non-compliance with laws-and regulations"
or have a financial condition that is sufficiently weak so as to make it so
vulnerable tothe onset of adverse business conditions that the bank
might fail if "concerted action is not effective in correcting the areas of
weakness." 52
When a bank's problems are grounded in self-dealing, by the time
regulators begin to focus "extra attention" on the institution, it may be
too late. In theory, all banks are supposed to be examined once a year.
However, the FDIC reports that due to staffing problems, the books of
roughly half of the problem banks supervised by the FDIC have not
been examined in more than a year.53 The FSLIC, which oversees
much of the nation's thrift industry, has even more severe staffing
problems. To make matters worse, the current spate of bank failures
has placed such an enormous burden on bank examiners that federal
"examiners are being overwhelmed by the workload ... [and] are fall-
ing far behind in audits of banks with known problems... [and] may be
failing to identify [apparently] healthy banks that are slipping into
trouble." 54
William M. Isaac, the former chairman of the FDIC, has observed
that the shortage of bank examiners poses "an enormous risk to the
banking system."'55 Hiring more bank examiners would be costly, not
only because of the sheer numbers involved, but also because of the
high cost of training bank examiners and the need to compete with the
relatively high salaries offered by the private-sector banks to trained
bank examiners. 56 In addition, hiring more examiners would solve
only the numbers problem; it would not solve the problem of providing
examiners with the same incentives facing private-sector creditors. By
contrast, changing the regulatory system to give private parties incen-
tives to monitor bank activity would not only decrease the current pres-
sure on the bank examination system, but would have the added benefit
of forcing those parties who enjoy the benefits of the additional moni-
toring-shareholders and creditors-to bear the costs.
B. Insufficient Asset Diversification
There is considerable support for the proposition that expanding
the scope of permissible bank activities may reduce bank risk by en-
abling banks to diversify into investments with a low covariance to
52. FDIC Statements of Policy, Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System, 2-3
(1980), quoted in E. Symons &J. White, supra note 44, at 573-74.
53. Washington Post, Sept. 21, 1986, at DI, col. 4.
54. Id.
55. Remarks of William Isaac, former Chairman of the FDIC, quoted in
Washington Post, supra note 53, at DI, col. 5.
56. Washington Post, supra note 53, at D4, col. 1.
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traditional bank activities.5 7 Such activities will do well when tradi-
tional banking activities are suffering, thereby reducing the overall risk-
iness of banking. When a bank develops special expertise in evaluating
the credit risks of a single industry like cattle, oil, or commercial real
estate, the need to hedge against an economic downturn in this indus-
try becomes particularly acute.58
Two observations about the relationship between asset diversifica-
tion and the specific problem of bank failures need to be made. First,
the argument that the FDIC can monitor a restricted range of activities
with greater effectiveness than a broader range of activities is highly
suspect.5 9 However, even if the FDIC can monitor some bank activities
better than others, then outside monitors should also be able to moni-
tor some activities better than others. If this is the case, encouraging
private-sector monitoring activity as a supplement to federal monitor-
ing would produce a more efficient set of restrictions on banking activi-
ties than the ones that are the subject of so much current criticism.
Private creditors such as depositors would negotiate for additional ac-
tivity restrictions and be forced to pay for such restrictions in the form
of foregone interest. By contrast, under the current system depositors
have no reason to ask that banks restrict the scope of their activities.
A second and related reason why society will benefit if restrictions
on the scope of acceptable banking activities are generated through pri-
vate contracting is that Congress, unlike private creditors, is likely to
restrict the scope of bank activities for reasons that are wholly unre-
lated to public interest concerns such as increasing bank safety. Some
current bank activity restrictions can only be explained on the ground
that they provide to some well-organized economic interest group reg-
ulatory protection from potential competition from other banks. 60 The
57. See, e.g., Fischel, Rosenfield & Stillman, supra note 12, at 320-21 (explaining
the benefits of diversification).
58. Because the focus of this Article is on the bank failure problem, asset diversifi-
cation will not be discussed at length.
59. This argument is effectively attacked by Fischel, Rosenfield & Stillman, supra
note 12, at 321-22. As these authors observe, the argument that regulators can monitor
those activities and investments open to banks-loans to third world nations, for exam-
ple-more cheaply than those from which banks are barred is simply not plausible. The
reason banks sometimes are thought to be better able to monitor the prudence of com-
mercial loans to oil drilling is because it is assumed that they somehow can observe the
credit worthiness of the firm to whom a commercial loan is to be made independently of
their evaluation of the merits of a particular venture such as oil drilling. It is not possi-
ble to do this, however, because the credit worthiness of any firm depends on the viabil-
ity of the ventures it engages in. Therefore, a bank must be able to evaluate oil drilling
before it can evaluate a loan to a firm engaging in oil drilling.
60. At the local level, branching restrictions seem particularly amenable to the
charge that they are the product of interest-group pressure from the regulated industry.
See Butler & Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System, (forthcom-
ing 1988 Cornell L. Rev.). Similar inferences can be drawn as to restrictions on inter-
state banking. See Miller, Interstate Banking in the Court, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 179,
208-09.
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restrictions on certain bank underwriting activities are an especially
poignant example.6 ' When the scope of permissible bank activities is
restricted for reasons of economic protectionism, such restrictions in-
crease the probability of bank failure by barring banks from profita-
ble-and diversified-business ventures and forcing them to turn to
activities that offer lower risk-adjusted rates of return.
C. Fluctuations in the Business Cycle
In their classic book on the monetary economics of the Great
Depression, Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz distinguish between
bank-asset allocation decisions that are bad "ex ante" and those that
are bad "ex post."'6 2 Ex ante deterioration in the quality of a loan de-
scribes deterioration in the asset that takes place as a result of economic
characteristics that were latent at the time the loan was made. Ex post
deterioration refers to deterioration in asset quality attributable not to
conditions observable at the time the loan was made, but to unforesee-
able, systematic downturns in the business cycle. Friedman and
Schwartz attribute the increases in the default rate during the Depres-
sion to ex post deterioration-"the loans and investments came to frui-
tion and had to be repaid in the midst of a major depression" 6 3-rather
than to poor ex ante decision-making by bankers.
Considerable evidence supports the proposition that bankers can-
not protect themselves from ex post deterioration in asset quality as
successfully as they can protect themselves from ex ante deterioration.
Modem portfolio theory teaches that asset risk can be sorted into two
categories, firm-specific risk and systematic risk.64 Only firm-specific
risk can be avoided by diversifying one's asset portfolio. Systematic or
market risk describes those risk factors that affect the market as a whole
and thus cannot be diversified away through prudent portfolio selec-
tion. 65 An economic system that is vulnerable to severe systematic
shocks "takes much of the power to control asset quality out of the
hands of the banker." 66
From a regulatory perspective, the danger of severe and unantici-
pated fluctuations in the business cycle does not pose any particular
problems for banks as distinct from other firms. In addition, such fluc-
tuations do not pose the same threat to bank solvency as they once did.
As one commentator has observed, "[t]he moderation of the business
61. See Macey, Special Interest Groups Legislation and the Judicial Function: The
Dilemma of Glass-Steagall, 33 Emory LJ. 1, 17 (1984).
62. M. Friedman & A. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 354-56.
63. Id. at 354.
64. See generally J. Lorie & M. Hamilton, The Stock Market: Theories and Evi-
dence, chs. 10 & 12 (1973) (summarizing the attributes of firm-specific and systematic
risk and describing the phenomenon of diversification).
65. See id. at 204-05, 275.
66. Tussing, supra note 8, at 136.
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cycle that has appeared since World War II has put that power-and an
associated responsibility-squarely and unmistakably in the banker's
hands." 67
Another reason why fluctuations in the business cycle pose a lower
risk to banks now than in previous years is that it has become much
"easier... to acquire a substantial volume of essentially riskless assets,
just as it is easier to attain a high degree of asset liquidity." s68 The
growing size of the federal deficit-funded by the sale of United States
government debt obligations-has provided banks with a highly liquid
investment alternative that is virtually free of default risk. Further-
more, the interest rate risk that at one time characterized bank balance
sheets has now been substantially moderated by the use of various "gap
management" techniques that allow a bank to match the average dura-
tion of its assets and liabilities. 69 In sum, broad-based fluctuations in
the economy are no longer significant sources of bank failure. Rather,
the source "is almost certain to be an error in judgment on the part of
the bank's management." 70
III. BANK FAILURE POLICIES: THE FDIC's REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES
The remainder of this Article examines two bank regulatory
schemes that greatly affect banks' incentives for risk taking and the level
67. Id. Recent downturns in certain industries, particularly oil, gas and real estate,
have been blamed for a great many bank failures over the past decade. These problems,
however, do not represent failures attributable to undiversifiable, systematic risk.
Rather, these failures often represent a form of excessive risk taking by banks since pru-
dent asset-selection strategy ordinarily would dictate a diversification of the bank's asset
portfolio away from excessive concentration on particular industrial sectors. Note, how-
ever, that in some cases a bank's expertise may make it economically rational to concen-
trate on particular industrial sectors if the benefits of increased expected returns on
investment outweigh the costs of reduced diversification. In such cases, though, the risk
of nondiversification is latent at the time the loan is made.
68. Id. at 136.
69. "Interest rate risk" refers to the risk that banks incur due to the fact that their
assets traditionally have been placed in relatively illiquid, long-term investments, while
the bulk of their liabilities are due to creditors, such as depositors, on demand. This
makes banks particularly vulnerable to rising interest rates caused by events such as
inflation. If interest rates go up, the banks will not be able to earn more revenue on
their outstanding loans but their cost of funds will go up because depositors will de-
mand higher rates on their funds.
There are two approaches to "gap management" that can be used to mitigate the
problem of interest-rate risk. The first involves the liability side of the bank's balance
sheet, and the second involves the asset side. First, banks can limit the ability of credi-
tors such as depositors to obtain their money on demand. Depositors may be willing to
accept restrictions on their ability to withdraw money in exchange for a higher interest
rate. Second, banks can purchase short-term assets that match the short-term nature of
their liabilities. They can also "securitize their assets" and sell them for immediate cash.
To securitize an asset is to bundle the asset with other income-producing assets and sell
the income stream to investors in the form of a security.
70. Tussing, supra note 8, at 136.
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of monitoring activity that banks receive. First, the Article assesses the
settlement practices used by the FDIC when a bank is closed. This ex-
amination shows that current settlement policies may in some cases ex-
acerbate the hazards of excessive risk taking and thus may occasionally
contribute to the bank-failure problem. The following section exam-
ines the market for control of banks. The market for bank control has
the potential to provide a substantial level of monitoring of bank man-
agement which could supplement current levels of monitoring by regu-
lators. Unfortunately, current law and administrative policies
regarding bank takeovers remove many of the incentives of outside bid-
ders to provide this valuable monitoring function.
Strangely enough, although the FDIC administers the insurance
fund for all insured banks, it lacks the power to close any bank or to
petition a court for the appointment of a receiver of a failed bank.7'
The power to close a national bank lies with the Comptroller of the
Currency in the case of national banks72 and with the relevant state
bank examiner in the case of state chartered banks.73
The FDIC generally becomes the receiver of a failed bank. This is
the case as a matter of law for national banks74 and as a matter of cus-
tom for state chartered banks.75 Thus, when a bank fails, the FDIC
typically acts in its corporate capacity as insurer and administrator of
FDIC insured banks and also as receiver of the failed bank. In its cor-
porate capacity the FDIC is obligated to protect insured deposits. In its
capacity as receiver, the FDIC "must engage in the traditional activities
of receiver" 76 which involves marshalling the debtor bank's assets on
behalf of the creditors, controlling disbursements, and most impor-
tantly, determining the form of insolvency that will best protect the ag-
gregate interests of bank creditors.
The FDIC has four basic regulatory options when confronted with
a troubled bank. It may use open bank assistance to keep a troubled
bank afloat. If the bank is closed, the FDIC may use the old-fashioned
deposit-payout approach and actually liquidate the bank. In addition,
the FDIC may invoke such recently developed alternatives as the modi-
fied-payoff approach or the purchase and assumption method of deal-
ing with an insolvent financial institution.
71. E. Symons &J. White, supra note 44, at 600-01.
72. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (1982).
73. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 658.79 (West 1984); Ind. Code Ann. § 28-1-3.1-2
(Bums 1986).
74. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (1982).
75. Bennett, Bank Regulation and Deposit Insurance: Controlling the FDIC's
Losses, Econ. Rev., Fed. Reserve Bank of San Francisco 16, 23 n.11 (1984); E. Symons &
J. White, supra note 44, at 600.
76. E. Symons &J. White, supra note 44, at 600.
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A. Open Bank Assistance
Before a troubled bank has been formally declared insolvent, the
FDIC may, under certain conditions, provide it with direct financial
assistance in order to prevent it from failing. Prior to the amendment
of 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c) in 1982, the FDIC was able to provide direct
monetary assistance to an open bank only if the continued operation of
the bank was "essential to provide adequate banking service in the
community."'77 After 1982, however, the FDIC's power to provide
assistance to a troubled bank was expanded considerably in a wide vari-
ety of ways, so that it includes the abilities to purchase the bank's bad
loans and buy its preferred stock or other securities, excluding com-
mon stock.78
If the following conditions are met, the FDIC has the "sole discre-
tion" to provide open bank assistance even if the continued operation
of the bank is not essential to provide adequate banking services in its
community. 79 First, in all cases, the amount provided in the form of
open bank assistance must be no greater than the amount that the
FDIC would have to pay out if it liquidated the bank and reimbursed
the insured depositors from the insurance fund.80 While this may ap-
pear to be a significant curb on the FDIC's discretion, in fact it is not.81
As Professor Kane has observed, the method of calculating the alterna-
tive methods of failure resolution in particular cases is "left to the dis-
cretion of the agency involved."8 2
In addition to the cost test described above, the FDIC must deter-
mine that either (1) the bank applying for direct assistance is about to
close83 or has already closed,8 4 or (2) severe financial conditions exist
that threaten the stability of a significant number of insured banks or a
smaller number of insured banks with significant financial resources,
and that the potential financial repercussions from the insured institu-
tion's financial instability poses a risk to the FDIC as insurer.85
Under the restrictive conditions that existed prior to 1982, the
77. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c) (1976), amended by Garn-St Germain Depository Institu-
tions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 111, 96 Stat. 1469, 1469-71 (current version at
12 U.S.C. § 1823(c) (1982)).
78. Id. § 1823(c)(1) (1982); id. § 1823(c)(4)(B) (FDIC may not buy common or vot-
ing stock).
79. Id § 1823(c).
80. Id. § 1823(c)(4)(A).
81. See generally E. Kane, The Gathering Crisis in Federal Deposit Insurance
45-50 (1985).
82. Id. at 46. It is not possible to evaluate the calculations of the FDIC in any
systematic way because "the agencies [do not] report their methods for estimating the
costs of alternative approaches in sufficient detail to let an external critic reproduce their
alternative estimates." Id.
83. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(1)(A) (1982).
84. Id. § 1823(c)(1)(B).
85. Id. § 1823(c)(1)(C).
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FDIC utilized direct assistance only five times.8 6 One commentator,
writing shortly after the legislative changes were implemented, opined
that "it is doubtful whether use of the power will substantially increase
in the future."87 This prognostication at first seemed to be correct;
from 1983 until the end of 1986, only sixteen banks had received open
bank assistance.88
On December 2, 1986, however, the FDIC promulgated new
guidelines for determining when troubled banks qualify for open bank
assistance.8 9 These guidelines became necessary after the 1982 legisla-
tive changes because of the strong demand for such assistance by banks
that consider it the most desirable form of resolving their economic
difficulties. Banks' preference for direct assistance is unsurprising since
it is the only avenue that provides shareholders of insolvent institutions
with a chance to recover their initial investment.
There are indications that, under its new guidelines, the FDIC is
making open bank assistance more readily available. 90 In 1987, the
FDIC provided open bank assistance to nineteen banks. 91 The new
guidelines contain four basic criteria for determining when a bank is
eligible for open bank assistance. A bank's proposal for open bank
assistance "should meet [these] guidelines except where there are com-
pelling reasons to the contrary .... -92
First, the cost to the FDIC of the bank's proposal must clearly be
less than other available alternatives, as determined by looking at two
factors. The FDIC will look at the amount by which the liabilities of the
bank exceed the value of the bank's assets, and then at the amount of
the deficit that would be borne by the FDIC in the event the depositors
86. E. Symons &J. White, supra note 44, at 602.
87. Id.
88. FDIC, 1987 Ann. Rep. 4 (1988).
89. FDIC Statement of Policy and Criteria on Assistance to Operating Insured
Banks, 51 Fed. Reg. 44,122 (1986) [hereinafter FDIC Statement].
90. The "FDIC Watch" of October 3, 1986, issued while the new legislation was
being drafted, went so far as to suggest that bank regulators were preparing "to deal
with a torrent of troubled banks through open bank assistance." Regulators Mull
Proper Use of Open Bank Assistance, The FDIC Watch, Oct. 3, 1986, at H-4.
No dramatic increase in the incidence of open bank assistance after the 1982
amendments was observed because the policy of the FDIC developed under Chairman
William M. Isaac in 1983 was to deny direct financial assistance to keep a troubled bank
open "if shareholders and management received undue benefit or a financial benefit
greater than if the bank were closed." FDIC Reconsiders Policy on Aid to Troubled
Banks, ABA Bankers Weekly, Sept. 30, 1986, at 3, col. 1. By contrast, the current FDIC
Chairman, William L. Seidman, has indicated that, while the FDIC will continue to be
"very tough" in its selection of banks qualifying for open bank assistance, it plans to
expand the situations in which such assistance might be used. In addition, Seidman
indicated that an open bank assistance program that provided no benefits to sharehold-
ers "is not always in the insurance fund's best interest... [or] always justified." Id.
91. FDIC, supra note 88, at 4.
92. See FDIC Statement, supra note 89, at 44,122.
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have to be repaid directly by the FDIC as in the case of an insolvency. 5
This new guideline is unlikely to operate as a significant curb on the
FDIC's statutory discretion to grant open bank assistance. In making
the determination that open bank assistance is less costly than other
alternatives, the FDIC will estimate "the value of the bank's assets
based on available examination data and prior experience in collection of
failed bank assets."94 Clearly the FDIC has sufficient discretion under
this rather vague criterion to employ direct-bank assistance under a va-
riety of circumstances. In addition, when employing the cost calcula-
tion, the FDIC considers other factors such as the higher administrative
costs of alternative insolvency schemes, 95 all of which are sufficiently
vague to provide the FDIC with a significant degree of discretion.
The second criterion for determining whether open bank assist-
ance may be used is whether the proposal provides a "reasonable assur-
ance of the future viability of the bank." 96 This, in turn, will depend
on whether the proposal for open bank assistance provides for "ade-
quate managerial resources" and "sufficient tangible capitalization." 97
It is generally expected that open bank assistance will result in the rene-
gotiation or termination of management contracts.98 New compensa-
tion packages and termination agreements must meet with FDIC
approval.99
Third, FDIC assistance "must be accompanied by significant capi-
tal infusions from non-FDIC sources." 100 The FDIC does require that
the "financial effect on common shareholders and holders of material
amounts of subordinated debt and/or preferred stock must approxi-
mate the effect which would have occurred had the assisted bank
failed."' 0 ' But shareholders who cause their banks to apply to the
FDIC for open bank assistance under the FDIC's new guidelines obvi-
ously believe they are better off under such an assistance plan than
under an insolvency plan, or else they would not have filed an applica-
tion for open bank assistance. 10 2
93. Id. at n.1.







101. Id. at 44,123.
102. Thus, the requirement that open bank assistance "approximate" the effect of
insolvency is not entirely credible, particularly in light of contemporaneous FDIC pro-
nouncements such as the one by Douglas H. Jones, Deputy General Counsel for Open-
Bank Regulation and Supervision, that "it doesn't always pay to wipe out shareholders
...." Open-Bank Assistance: Watershed Change in Regulation, The FDIC Watch, Oct.
10, 1986, at H-5. Shareholders and subordinated creditors, who recover nothing in a
typical insolvency, clearly are better off if they can manage to obtain open bank assist-
ance. Indeed, a number of banking lawyers have developed extensive expertise and
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Fourth, the proposal for FDIC assistance must provide assurances
that the FDIC's money will be used to benefit the bank and not be di-
verted to other purposes.1 0 3 This requirement insures that banks re-
ceiving open bank assistance do not use the money to pay off favored
creditors or to finance other actions that do not improve the bank's
long-term chances of survival. The FDIC does allow open bank assist-
ance to benefit the shareholders and other creditors of a troubled
bank,10 4 but will only permit such assistance "where compelling rea-
sons require it, and then only when the holding company acts as a con-
duit for providing assistance to the bank."' 0 5
It is difficult to gauge whether the benefits of open bank assistance
outweigh the costs even when the evaluation is made on a case-by-case
basis. It does seem clear that the FDIC's current method of calculating
costs is flawed. Under the current method, the FDIC compares the
costs of open bank assistance directly with such other regulatory alter-
natives as liquidating the bank. 10 6 The problem with this method of
calculation is that it does not take into account error costs-the
probability that the bank ultimately fails despite the FDIC cash infu-
sion. When this happens, the ultimate costs to the FDIC of paying off
shareholders must be layered onto the costs of the initial open bank
assistance. While the insolvency costs may be mitigated to some extent
by the earlier cash infusion, some significant costs are not overlap-
ping. 10 7 Indeed, the history of the earlier cases of open bank assistance
reputational capital in handling petitions for open bank assistance. These lawyers' cli-
ents plainly are of the opinion that they have something to gain from keeping the institu-
tions open with infusions of capital by the FDIC.
103. FDIC Statement, supra note 89, at 44,122.
104. ABA Bankers Weekly, Sept. 30, 1986, at 3, col. 1.
105. FDIC Statement, supra note 89, at 44,123.
106. By law, no alternative may be used when selecting among the various strate-
gies to be used in a bank failure unless that strategy is less costly than liquidation or the
bank is essential to provide adequate banking services in the community. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823(c)(4)(A) (1982). The FDIG bases its analysis of whether open bank assistance is
less costly than the other regulatory alternative on two factors:
(a) the amount by which the liabilities of the bank exceed the value of the
bank's assets, and (b) the portion of this deficit which would be borne by the
FDIC in the event of a payoff. The FDIC estimates the value of the bank's
assets based on available examination data and prior experience in collecting
failed bank assets. In applying its cost calculation, the FDIG considers the pre-
mium that may be received for a closed bank in a purchase and assumption
transaction and the administrative cost of paying off depositors. The FDIC also
may consider other factors such as interest on funds it advances and the cost of
maintaining a liquidation operation.
FDIC Statement, supra note 89, at 44,122 n. 1.
107. The administrative costs of paying off depositors and the cost of maintaining a
liquidation operation are obvious examples of nonoverlapping costs. But perhaps more
significant are the costs to the FDIC due to additional bad loans made between the date
of an initial cash infusion and the'date when the bank finally is closed or merged. Espe-
cially troubling are additional extensions of credit made to keep current borrowers tem-
porarily afloat during this interim period, since they represent a paradigmatic case of
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is not very encouraging. Only one of the first five banks to receive such
assistance remains open under the same ownership.' 08
Thus, once the FDIC reaches its initial calculation of the costs of
using open bank assistance under its current methodology, it should
then generate an estimate of the costs that the FDIC will incur if the
open bank assistance program ultimately does not work, and then mul-
tiply this figure by the probability of such a failure occurring. This fig-
ure should then be added to the initial calculation of the costs of using
open bank assistance to give a more accurate determination of the ex-
pected costs of using open bank assistance. 10 9
While the point is not entirely free from doubt, the relevant statute
"throwing good money after bad." A bank in trouble is also likely to offer higher-than-
market interest rates on deposits in order to attract new capital to shore up its opera-
tions. Such measures may act as palliatives in the short term, but are likely to drive the
bank even further under water over the long run. Indeed, as Stanley Silverberg, the
FDIC's director of research has noted: "If a bank becomes insolvent but remains liquid
and open, it is generally in the interest of managers and owners to gamble in an effort to
recoup, especially if that can be done legally. If the bank rolls the dice and loses, the
FDIC typically bears the loss." G. Kaufman, supra note 20, at 9.
A striking example of this phenomenon appears to have occurred in the case of two
California FSLIC-insured savings and loan associations that failed inJune, 1988. One of
these institutions, the North America Savings and Loan Association, was paying an aver-
age deposit rate of 8.53%, 145 basis points above the national average at the time. (A
basis point is one one-hundredth of a percentage point.) The other S&L, American
Diversified, paid an average deposit rate of 8.64%, 156 basis points above the average.
Queue Forms for FSLIC's Biggest Payout, Am. Banker, June 7, 1988, at 1, col. 1, 22, col.
2. Both of these banks engaged in extremely high-risk loans. According to regulators,
North America invested in high-risk real estate, while American Diversified had invested
money in windmill farms and a plant that was supposed to generate electricity from cow
manure. Id.
108. FDIC, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation: The First Fifty Years 95
(1984). The fact that the banks have not remained open under the same ownership
indicates that the problems with the banks stemmed from the current bank management
because management changes generally accompany ownership changes. The fact that
the FDIC had to change the ownership after open bank assistance indicates that the
banks did not perform well under the management that received the open bank
assistance.
109. To illustrate, suppose the FDIC determines that the cost of open bank assist-
ance in a particular instance is $450,000 because the bank's insured liabilities exceed its
net assets by that amount after the infusion of capital from private sources. Assume
further that the cost (in present value terms) of the next best regulatory alternative will
be $500,000. Under the current policy guidelines the bank is eligible for direct, pre-
insolvency assistance from the FDIC. The problem with this methodology is that it
presumes that there is probability of 1.0 that the open bank assistance program will be
successful, that the bank will achieve long-run solvency and present no further drain on
the FDIC's resources. It is extremely unlikely that this occurs every time open bank
assistance is used. Thus, suppose there is a twenty percent probability that the bank's
depositors eventually will need FDIC protection after the bank has been given open
bank assistance. If this additional assistance will involve a cost (in present value terms)
of $300,000, the cost of the open bank assistance program would be an additional
$60,000 (300,000 X .2), bringing the total to $510,000. Under the revised method of
calculation, open bank assistance would not be permitted under the current guidelines
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may already require that the FDIC's cost determinations account for
the probability of failure. Section 1823(c)(4)(A) requires that open
bank assistance be used only when the cost of such assistance does not
exceed "that amount which the Corporation determines to be reason-
ably necessary to save the cost of liquidating, including paying the in-
sured accounts of, such insured bank." 110 Congress clearly designed
the statute to permit open bank assistance in order to preserve the
corpus of the FDIC insurance fund. As such, it seems appropriate to
look at the total expected cost of open bank assistance, including the
probability of the assisted bank ultimately failing, when making the stat-
utorily required cost calculation.
From a broader perspective, even when a troubled bank meets the
stricter requirements of the modified cost test described above, it is not
clear that open bank assistance serves the long-run interests of the
FDIG or of the banking system as a whole. The increased use of open
bank assistance contemplated by the FDIC in its recent policy guide-
lines greatly exacerbates the disincentive to monitor created by deposit
insurance. Open bank assistance provides an effective government sub-
sidy not only for insured depositors, but also for uninsured depositors
and all other creditors. If these creditors expect open bank assistance
to bail out the banks to whom they have loans outstanding, they lack
any incentive to incur costs in monitoring such banks.
It might be argued that the effects of open bank assistance in re-
ducing monitoring are mitigated by the inability of depositors and cred-
itors to predict ex ante which banks will receive open bank assistance
and their resulting need to continue to engage in some monitoring ac-
tivities, albeit at a lower level, than if there were no prospect of such
assistance. However, creditors and depositors are able to predict in
general fashion which banks are more likely to qualify for open bank
assistance and thus can direct their resources to those banks. Indeed, it
is likely that large depositors expend significant resources in assessing
the type of bailout regulators are likely to use."1 ' If the regulatory
which state that the cost to the FDIC of open bank assistance "clearly must be less than
other available alternatives." FDIC Statement, supra note 89, at 44,122.
110. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A) (1982).
111. Large depositors have to invest resources (hire lawyers) to keep them ap-
praised of the evolving world of bank-failure policy in sufficient detail to permit them to
judge how failure of their bank will be handled. This cost must be added to the cost of
assessing changes in the nature of the bank itself to determine whether the bank is likely
to fail and how the FDIC thinks this particular bank fits into its overall bank-failure strat-
egy. The latter determination requires information about the bank that may be different
from the information needed to make a credit appraisal and this involves the expense of
added resources by the depositors. In particular, the sources of the bank's liabilities
(i.e., whether the bank has obtained funds from other banks and hence must be bailed
out to prevent a wave of bank failures), as well as the nature and quality of its assets, is
relevant to depositors who want to know how the failure of their bank will be handled by
the FDIG.
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scheme were improved, at least some of these resources would be allo-
cated to monitoring the performance of bank management.
Two sorts of insured banks, the nation's very largest and the na-
tion's very smallest, are much more likely to receive open bank assist-
ance than all other banks. The smallest banks are likely to receive
direct assistance because the FDIC no longer is required to determine
that such assistance is the least costly way of handling the bank's finan-
cial problems if the bank "is essential to provide adequate banking
services" in its community. 1 2 And if a bank is "essential," the cash
infusion does not even have to be less costly than alternative forms of
insolvency for the FDIC to make use of it.
113
More important than the use of open bank assistance for small
communities is the use of such assistance for the nation's very largest
banks. The most dramatic-and controversial-open bank assistance
plan was the 1984 bailout of Continental Illinois, which protected all of
the bank's depositors and general creditors from loss, and even went so
far as to protect the creditors of the parent bank holding company." 
4
The FDIC decided to use open bank assistance to aid Continental
because it was concerned that closing the bank would cause a ripple
effect that would be particularly damaging to many of the nation's small
banks. 115 Thus, open bank assistance seemed appropriate since the
situation was one in which "severe financial conditions exist which
threaten the stability of a significant number of insured banks."
116
While it is not clear that the failure of Continental would have caused a
problem for other banks,"17 the Continental bailout has important
precedential implications, particularly because it appears to have been
a success.' 18 Indeed, the FDIC recently rescued the huge First Repub-
112. The requirement that the FDIC determine that the continued operation of the
bank is essential to the banking service of the community was eliminated in 1982. E.
Symons &J. White, supra note 44, at 601.
113. 12 U.S.C. § 1823 (c)(4)(A) (1982).
114. See The Continental Illinois Assistance Program: The View of the FDIC,
Issues in Bank Reg., Spring 1984, at 3-5; Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the
FDIC & the Fed. Reserve Bd., A Permanent Assistance Program for Continental Illinois
National Bank and Trust Company, Issues in Bank Reg., Spring 1984, at 6-10.
Like all direct-assistance plans, the Continental rescue was designed to provide the
bank with sufficient capital to enable it to regain its position as a viable lending institu-
tion. Toward this end, the FDIC bought $4.5 billion of troubled loans from Continental
for $3.5 billion, as well as two issues of nonvoting preferred stock from the bank's hold-
ing company for $1 billion. Id. at 2. The FDIC is not permitted to acquire voting stock
in a bank that it insures. 12 U.S.C. § 1823 (c)(4)(B) (1982).
115. See I. Sprague, Bailout: An Insider's Account of Bank Failures and Rescues
183 (1986).
116. FDIC Statement, supra note 89, at 44,122.
117. See G. Kaufman, supra note 20, at 1; Miller, Public Policy Implications of Leg-
islation Limiting the Growth of Interstate Banks, in Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago, Pro-
ceedings of a Conference on Bank Structure and Competition 602, 614-16 (1986).
118. See Note, The Modified Payoff of Failed Banks: A Settlement Practice To In-
ject Market Discipline Into the Commercial Banking System, 73 Va. L. Rev. 1349, 1362
1180 [Vol. 88:1153
HeinOnline -- 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1180 1988
BANK FAILURES
licBank Corp., a Dallas-based bank holding company, on terms closely
resembling the Continental rescue.1 19
While the FDIC generally attempts to merge failed banks with
healthier banks in order to avoid direct payments from the insurance
fund, when banks as large as Continental get into financial difficulty it is
often difficult to find a merger partner with sufficient capital to effect a
merger. This circumstance, coupled with the suggestion after the Con-
tinental bailout by the Comptroller of the Currency that the nation's
eleven largest banks were too big to fail, 120 sent a clear signal that open
bank assistance would be used to protect all bank creditors whenever a
very large bank experiences serious financial difficulty.
While this policy may save the FDIC money on a case-by-case basis,
it not only reduces the incentives investors have for monitoring large
banks, but it also undermines the incentives such depositors have for
developing contractual and other provisions to ensure that banks con-
trol their level of risk taking ex ante. As such, the FDIC's open bank
assistance policy, if ever utilized on a widespread basis, may ultimately
result in a weaker banking system since it creates incentives for banks to
engage in greater risk taking than they otherwise would.
Open bank assistance may also affect smaller and mid-sized banks
because it will drive large depositors from those banks to larger banks
where their funds are effectively guaranteed against loss by the FDIC's
bank-closure policies. 121 To compete for the funds of the larger, unin-
(1987); Continental Illinois Adds $500 Million to Loan Reserves, Wall St. J., June 23,
1987, at 14, col. 3. But see Five Big Banks Post Rises in Net for Quarter: Tax Act Spurs
Gains, Wall St. J., Jan. 15, 1987, at 11, cols. 3-5 (attributing Continental's gains to tax-
related causes rather than operating profits). Additionally, Continental is in the process
of purchasing other banks in the area in order to expand its deposit base. FDIC Board
Allows Continental Illinois to Seek Purchases, Wall St. J., Aug. 27, 1986, at 4, col. 5.
An options trading subsidiary of Continental Illinois Corp., Continental's parent
holding company, experienced losses of about $90 million as a result of the stock market
turbulence in October, 1987. See Losses Posted by Continental Illinois Unit, Wall St.J.,
Oct. 27, 1987, at 4, col. 1. Whether these events have any adverse effects on the bank's
profits remains to be seen.
119. See Am. Banker, Mar. 18, 1988, at 1, col. 4. The FDIC lent $1 billion to a
number of the holding company's subsidiary banks and guaranteed all of the banks'
current and future depositors and creditors, including those not covered by deposit in-
surance. Id.
120. See U.S. Won't Let 11 Biggest Banks in Nation Fail, Wall St.J., Sept. 20, 1984,
at 2, col. 2 (quoting testimony of Comptroller of the Currency Conover at House
Banking Committee hearing on Sept. 18-19, 1984).
121. The observation that rational, uninsured depositors will remove their funds
from small- and mid-sized banks to banks deemed "too large to fail" holds when the
banks are offering depositors the same rate of return on their deposits.
Smaller banks are disadvantaged by the flight of large depositors because the need
to attract additional insured deposits to replace the large depositors that are uninsured
if they remain with the smaller banks raises their costs of capital. In addition, there are
obvious economies of scale associated with administering depository accounts. The
costs of administering a $1 million account are not one million times higher than the
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sured depositors; smaller banks may be forced to offer higher interest
rates to compensate depositors for the increased risk associated with
banking at such institutions.1 22
B. Purchase and Assumption Transactions
Purchase and assumption (P&A) is the FDIC's strategy of choice
when confronted with an insolvent bank. 123 In a P&A transaction, the
deposits of the failed bank are assumed by another bank, which also
purchases some of the failed bank's assets.1 24 In the past, the FDIC
acquired all of the bank's bad loans itself and sold only "acceptable
assets" to the acquiring bank. This policy provided the acquiring bank
with a clean bank relatively free of troubled loans. On occasion, how-
ever, the FDIC has required an acquiring institution to purchase all of
the loans of the troubled bank, including the bad loans.125
1. The Standard Purchase and Assumption. - Current law appropri-
ately gives the FDIC considerable flexibility to determine the structure,
terms, and other details of a P&A transaction. When, for example, the
value of the assets purchased by the sound bank are less than the value
of the deposit liabilities assumed, the FDIC provides financial assist-
ance in the amount of the difference. 126 Similarly, the FDIC sometimes
agrees to repurchase loans and other assets from acquiring banks if the
assets are thought to be valuable, but then turn out to be nonperform-
ing after a stated period of time.
As with open bank assistance plans, the FDIC, despite its consider-
able administrative discretion, is not authorized to execute a P&A trans-
costs of administering a $1 account. As such, the lower average size of deposits in
smaller accounts will mean that their average costs of doing business are higher, even in
the unlikely event that they are able to attract a sufficient number of new smaller deposi-
tors to make up for the large depositors they lose to larger banks.
122. See Staff of Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., Ist
Sess., Continental Illinois National Bank: Report of an Inquiry into its Federal Supervi-
sion and Assistance 18 (Comm. Print 1985) ("over time large banks will be able to at-
tract capital at lower cost than comparably sized nonbanking companies and smaller
banks"); Macey & Garrett, supra note 19, at 234-35.
123. E.g., Gilbert, Recent Changes in Handling Bank Failures and Their Effects on
the Banking Industry, Econ. Rev., The Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, June/July 1985,
at 22 ("The FDIC prefers to handle most bank failure cases through... (P&A) transac-
tions"); see also Bennett, supra note 75, at 24-25 ("The P&A is preferred because it is
less disruptive than the payoff approach and has apparent cost advantages.").
124. See generally Burgee, Purchase and Assumption Transactions Under the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 14 Forum 1146, 1154-55 (1979) (discussing the struc-
ture of the typical P&A transaction).
125. Caliguire & Thomson, FDIC Policies for Dealing with Failed and Troubled
Institutions, Econ. Commentary, Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Oct. 1, 1987, at 2 n.4
("Operating under the philosophy that loan collection is best accomplished locally, the
FDIC has begun experimenting with leaving the delinquent loans in the failed-bank
package.").
126. Gilbert, supra note 123, at 22.
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action unless this alternative meets a statutory cost test.' 27 The FDIC
must determine that the funds it provides in a P&A transaction will not
be greater than the cost of liquidating the bank, except when the con-
tinued operation of the bank is essential to provide adequate banking
services in the bank's community.128
Thus, a !&A transaction is simply "a merger of a failing bank into a
successful bank, with the successful bank paying a certain amount for
the goodwill value of the failing bank."' 29 Despite the statutory lan-
guage of the cost test, which implies that the test will be administered
on a case-by-case basis, the observed behavior of the FDIC indicates
that the agency has, as a matter of administrative policy, determined
that bank failures should always be handled by P&A transactions when
possible.' 30
The FDIC finds P&A transactions to be superior to straight liqui-
dation for several reasons. First, P&A often requires no immediate ex-
penditure of funds from the FDIC insurance fund because the
acquiring bank assumes the liabilities of insured depositors.131 In addi-
tion, regulators claim that P&A transactions are preferable to straight
liquidations because they avoid the temporary disruption of banking
services that typically accompany liquidations 132 and preserve "going
concern" value and good will.13s Finally, P&A transactions have the
supposed advantage of providing protection for all depositors, even those
whose deposits exceed the FDIC's $100,000 limits.
The FDIC's preference for P&A transactions over straight liquida-
tions provides distinct advantages to two interested groups-medium-
sized banks and large, uninsured depositors. P&A transactions benefit
medium-sized banks because they remove the regulatory bias in favor
of the nation's very largest banks that came in the wake of the bailout of
the uninsured claimants on Continental Illinois. The protection of
large uninsured depositors in that transaction provided an incentive for
127. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A) (1982).
128. Id.
129. E. Symons &J. White, supra note 44, at 620-21.
130. See Gilbert, supra note 123, at 22.
The FDIC generally will accept the highest bid for the P&A transaction if its net
cost is lower than the estimated costs of a deposit payoff. These estimates are
not very precise, and the FDIC has tended to use the P&A method except in
situations in which:
1. there is virtually no interest by other banks in acquiring the failed
bank, or
2. fraud or other circumstances, such as contingent liabilities, make it dif-
ficult to estimate losses ....
Id.
131. E. Symons &J. White, supra note 44, at 602.
132. See Burgee, supra note 124, at 1153.
133. Bennett, supra note 75, at 25; Burgee, supra note 124, at 1155; Garrison,
Short & O'Driscoll, Financial Stability and FDIC Insurance, in The Financial Services
Revolution: Policy Directions for the Future 203 (C. England & T. Huertas eds. 1988).
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such depositors to shift their funds from mid-sized banks to the na-
tion's largest banks. 134 The regulatory preference for P&A transac-
tions, because it also provides protection for large depositors,
effectively mitigates the migration of uninsured deposits to larger
banks. As such, it is not surprising that, despite occasional cries of ad-
ministrative bias in favor of the very largest banks in the wake of Conti-
nental Illinois, the empirical evidence shows that large depositors have
not shifted their uninsured funds from medium-sized to large banks
since that bailout, 135
Regardless of whether uninsured depositors keep their funds at
large or small banks, the FDIC preference for P&A transactions has the
additional effect of benefiting large depositors by providing them with
low-risk repositories for their funds. It is not as clear, however, that
P&A transactions provide the same benefits to the public. The FDIC's
preference for such transactions removes most of the incentive that
large depositors have to provide market discipline for the risks assumed
by a bank whose failure is expected to be handled by P&A. Thus, while
P&A transactions provide benefits to the FDIC in the short run because
they protect its cash position, the long-run results may take the form of
increased bank failures due to excessive risk taking by banks.
2. The Modified Payout. - The FDIC's preference for P&A transac-
tions seems particularly odd in light of the availability of a variant on
the straight payout, the so-called "modified payout," which has many of
the advantages of a straight P&A, but retains some of the elements of
market discipline lacking in the current system.13 6 The FDIC devel-
oped the modified payout method of handling bank insolvency and an-
nounced it as a new procedure in 1983.137 When a modified payout is
used, "the FDIC makes full payments to insured depositors and partial
payments to [uninsured] depositors" based on the FDIC's "estimate of
the proceeds [of a] liquidation of the ... failed bank. If recoveries on
the assets . . .exceed th[is] initial estimate, the uninsured depositors
receive additional payments." If recoveries fall short of the estimate,
"the FDIC absorbs the loss."138
134. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
135. Gilbert, supra note 123, at 25.
The share of large-denomination time deposits at the small banks did decline
from almost 40 percent in the first week of May 1984 [following the announce-
ment of the Continental bailout in mid-May of that year] to about 37 percent
.... That change might reflect an initial response by depositors to the han-
dling of the Continental Illinois situation by the FDIC .... Whatever the cause
of that dip, it was more than reversed by October [1984], and the share of large
time deposits at small banks continued to rise through May 1985.
Id.
136. Macey & Garrett, supra note 19, at 237.
137. 1 General Accounting Office, Staff Study, Deposit Insurance: Analysis of Re-
form Proposals 33 (1986).
138. Gilbert, supra note 123, at 22; see also Note, supra note 118, at 1378-81
(describing the modified payout approach).
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Like a P&A transaction, a modified payout does not disrupt the
insured depositor's activities because these bank liabilities are trans-
ferred to another bank.139 As with P&A, the FDIC arranges the merger
of the failed bank with a healthy bank and provides cash to cover any
shortfall between the value of the assets purchased and the value of the
liabilities assumed by the healthy bank. The major difference between
the two types of transactions is that the modified payout provides unin-
sured depositors with a significant incentive for monitoring the banks
where their funds are held and for imposing discipline on excessive risk
taking.
The FDIC used the modified-payout system in twenty-one bank
failures between 1983 and 1985.140 On average, uninsured depositors
received over forty percent of the balance of their accounts under these
payouts.14 ' Unfortunately the modified-payout experiment was only
used in the case of extremely small banks.142
If the modified-payout method were used in all bank failures it
would increase market discipline on the banking system without provid-
ing a regulatory advantage to larger banks. The modified-payout ex-
periment, however, was undermined when regulators decided that the
Continental Illinois crisis should not be handled by modified payout
because the losses to uninsured depositors would have been too
great.' 43 This decision reduced the credibility of the FDIC's statements
concerning the universal applicability of modified payouts and led to
the abandonment of the experimental program.' 44
No credible reason has ever been given for why the modified-pay-
out system was abandoned.' 45 The argument that modified payouts
undermine the policy of equal treatment of large and small banks begs
the question of why modified payouts cannot be used for large banks as
well as smaller banks. 146 Indeed, the decision to close the Penn Square
Bank without providing protection for uninsured depositors indicates
that an institution of substantial size can be permitted to close without
139. Note, supra note 118, at 1381.
140. Id. at 1380.
141. Id.
142. Gilbert, supra note 123, at 24 (data for seven modified payouts from March to
May 1984).
143. See The Continental Illinois Assistance Program: The View of the FDIC,
Issues Bank Reg., Spring 1984, at 3, 4. These depositors were mostly small banks who
were, because of their experience and expertise in banking, uniquely well suited to serve
as monitors. Id.
144. Working Group of the Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs, Recommenda-
tions for Change in the Federal Reserve System 48 (Jan. 1985); Note, supra note 118, at
1380 ("announcement of the direct assistance program for Continental Illinois in the
midst of the experiment with modified payoffs signaled the industry that the FDIC did
not intend to apply the technique universally and thus sharply undercut any market dis-
cipline engendered by the policy").
145. Note, supra note 118, at 1382-84.
146. Id.
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devastating disruptions to the financial system. Nevertheless, it might
be argued that the Penn Square and Continental Illinois situations must
be distinguished because of the much larger percentage of uninsured
deposits in Continental Illinois. 147 This argument, however, is unper-
suasive because the percentage of uninsured deposits in a bank such as
Continental is likely to be far lower if the owners of these funds are
faced with risk of loss. Indeed, the higher the percentage of uninsured
deposits at a troubled bank, the more willing the FDIC should be to use
a modified-payoff scheme since its exposure will be reduced by the
amount of such deposits. 148
Furthermore, the use of a modified-payout plan for banks with
large numbers of uninsured depositors will serve as a valuable signal to
other large depositors that they should monitor the banks in which
their uninsured deposits are held. It is possible that the heavy concen-
tration of uninsured depositors in certain banks such as Continental
reflects the decision by such depositors to engage the federal regulators
in a game of chicken. Under this strategy, uninsured depositors may
have gambled that they can achieve de facto deposit insurance by ag-
gregating all of their large deposits in a small number of banks on the
assumption that the FDIC will not dare effect an insolvency plan that
imposes such large losses on them. The gamble appears to have paid
off in the case of Continental, where the large percentage of uninsured
deposits was cited as a prime reason for the bailout of all depositors.1 49
In sum, the advantages in terms of increased market discipline of a
147. Sprague has estimated that a startling 90 percent of Continental's deposits
were uninsured. I. Sprague, supra note 115, at 184. By contrast, 52 percent of Penn
Square's depositors were uninsured. FDIC, 1982 FDIC Ann. Rep. 32 (1983).
148. It may also be argued that a modified-payoff scheme will cause large deposi-
tors to split their deposits among many accounts of depository institutions each coming
within the $100,000 deposit insurance ceiling. Deposit splitting of this kind would im-
pose costs on the depositors-and on society-in the form of the increased transaction
costs of maintaining numerous different accounts. Further, when deposits are split, the
money is likely to flow-with or without the services of deposit makers-into banks of-
fering the highest interest rates, which are likely to be among the more risky banks. In
this respect, the incentive for deposit splitting that modified payouts would create might
have the effect of marginally increasing bank risk. However, it is very likely that corpo-
rate depositors will continue to place uninsured money in banks they consider safe in
order to achieve the economics of maintaining a single account, and in order to maintain
good relations with a potential source of credit. Because substantial uninsured deposits
can be expected to remain in the banking system even if modified deposit payout is
adopted as the FDIC's preferred approach to bank failure, the value of market discipline
can be expected to be at least partially effective under such a system even without new
rules limiting deposit splitting. See infra notes 214-21 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing brokered deposits and deposit splitting).
149. See, e.g., Inquiry Into Continental Illinois Corp. and Continental Illinois
National Bank: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision,
Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 296 (1984) (testimony of C.T. Connover, Comptroller of the
Currency).
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modified-payout system appear to outweigh the disadvantages. The ex-
periment should be started again. This time the FDIC should make it
clear that it will consider modified payouts the method of choice in all
bank failure cases, large and small, unless strong countervailing consid-
erations indicate that one of the alternative approaches is preferable.
Although the FDIC now has the administrative discretion to use modi-
fied payouts whenever it considers them the best regulatory alternative,
the best way to employ modified payouts is for Congress to pass legisla-
tion requiring the FDIC to treat modified payouts as its method of
choice unless it decides to liquidate the bank.' 50 Without such legisla-
tion, the FDIC is likely to experience intense political pressure to bail
out large institutions with high levels of uninsured deposits. 151 In addi-
tion, legislation requiring a preference for modified payoffs would send
a clear signal to uninsured depositors that it is in their best interests to
impose market discipline through contractual controls on excessive risk
taking and through increased monitoring activity.
3. The Payout System and the Auction Theory. - While modified payout
is clearly preferable to purchase and assumption as a method for cop-
ing with bank failure, these alternatives have a common feature that has
the potential for imposing large regulatory costs on the FDIC.
Whether the FDIC disposes of the assets and liabilities of a bank
through a P&A transaction or a modified payoff, it conducts a sealed-
bid first-price auction, usually within a few days after the closure of the
failed bank.152 This auction procedure results in large wealth transfers
from the FDIC to the firms bidding for failed banks.
It is clear from the economic literature on auction mechanisms that
the procedures used for auctioning assets can have significant effects on
the revenues received by the seller. 155 Recent empirical studies of the
FDIC's auction procedures indicate that these procedures may cause
wealth transfers from the FDIC's insurance fund to the winning bidders
of these auctions. 154 The evidence also indicates that the auction pro-
cedures may result in a loss of real resources since the procedures may
exclude some bidders who value the assets of the failed bank more than
150. See Note, supra note 118, at 1378-85 (advocating "[ulniversal application of
a modified-payout approach," but noting that the limited tenure of FDIC officials tends
to put greater emphasis on short-term concerns).
151. Witness for example the intense political pressure placed on regulators-by
Speaker of the House Jim Wright in an effort to prevent them from dosing several Texas
savings and loan institutions. N.Y. Times, June 22, 1987, § I, at 12, col. 5; N.Y. Times,
Feb. 9, 1987, § IV, at 2, col. 1.
152. See James & Weir, An Analysis of FDIC Failed Bank Auctions 3 (Univ. of
Rochester Center for Res. in Gov't Pol'y & Bus. Working Paper GPB 86-06, Feb. 1987
rev.).
153. See French & McCormick, Sealed Bids, Sunk Costs, and the Process of Com-
petition, 57 J. Bus. 417 (1984) (citing additional authority).
154. See James & Weir, supra note 152, at 1.
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the winning bidder.1 55
Auction procedures for failed banks are complex.' 56 To be invited
to participate in an auction for a failed bank, a bidding bank must com-
ply with the FDIC's capital requirements and with relevant state and
federal laws governing bank acquisitions, be rated by regulators as a
low risk bank, and operate within the appropriate geographical bound-
aries.1 57 The process by which the FDIC determines who is eligible to
bid at the auctions it conducts is obscure. The Corporation "may so-
licit offers . . .as are practicable from any prospective purchasers or
merger partners it determines, in its sole discretion, are both qualified
and capable of acquiring the assets and liabilities of the closed bank or
the bank in danger of closing."' 58 The haste with which such auctions
are conducted requires the FDIC largely to rely on its own intuitions
about which bidders might be interested. In addition, the FDIC prefers
to keep the news about particular bank failures secret until it has
worked out the details of the assistance plan. This preference for se-
crecy prevents interested bidders who are not contacted by the FDIC
from coming forward on their own. Therefore, established banks are
almost always the only entities to participate in FDIC managed sealed-
bid auction and individual entrepreneurs who would enter the industry
by bidding on an insolvent bank are systematically excluded.
Thus, the haste with which the FDIC conducts its auctions may
prevent the assets of a failed bank from being allocated to their highest
valued user since such people may not be notified of the auction. 159 In
a world without transaction costs or legal regulation, this failure would
not matter from an efficiency perspective since the highest valuing user
155. Id. at 2.
156. It is possible under a narrow range of circumstances to conduct an auction for
a bank that has not yet been declared insolvent. If regulators have not closed the bank
to be sold, the bank's board of directors must specify in writing that the bank is in dan-
ger of closing and request in writing that the FDIC assist in the takeover. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823(f)(3)(B) (1982). In addition, the state bank supervisor must be consulted and be
given a reasonable opportunity to object to the FDIC's planned takeover, unless the
FDIC obtains a unanimous vote of the bank's board of directors.
157. See James & Weir, supra note 152, at 4.
158. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(f)(5) (1982).
159. This analysis of the costs of current FDIC auction procedures is confined to
the costs of particular sales as compared to an idealized auction process. The current
procedures might have advantages that offset these costs when viewed from a broader
perspective. Current auction procedures are conducted with great speed, and while this
forecloses the number of bidders who can participate, it has the offsetting benefit of
ensuring that depositors are not left without banking services for extended periods of
time. Nonetheless, it is difficult to imagine that the additional time necessary to attract
the number of bidders required to improve the competition at auctions would cause
losses to depositors of a magnitude great enough to offset the benefits of increasing the
pool of bidders. And, in cases where the bank has not yet closed, the additional delay
will not inconvenience depositors. In any event, the relevant consideration is whether
the gains from the higher bids obtainable in the lengthier time period offset any losses
depositors might suffer from a delay in obtaining their money.
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could always emerge after the auction to purchase the asset from the
winning bidder at the auction. However, in the real world of banking
regulation, the costs of such later acquisitions, are significantly in-
creased because the costs of obtaining regulatory approval will be
much higher and the ability of incumbent management to resist will
have been restored. 160
A recent empirical study by Professors James and Wier applied the
economic models of auctions developed by French and McCormick to
the auctions conducted by the FDIC in the failed-bank context.16' The
earlier work by French and McCormick showed that auctions which im-
pose restrictions on bidder participation reduce the price that sellers
receive for their assets at first-price sealed-bid auctions. 16 2 Further-
more, this will be true even when all of the bidders place the same value
on the assets being sold.' 63 Thus, even in those auctions that do not
exclude the bidder who values the object most highly, when the assets
of a failed bank are sold under current FDIC auction procedures, the
FDIC may not receive the highest possible bid price for the assets due
to the limitations it places on bidder participation. Indeed, there is
strong evidence that the FDIC's auction procedures transfer wealth
from the FDIC insurance fund to the winning bidders. 164
160. See infra notes 267-325 and accompanying text.
161. James & Weir, supra note 152.
162. French & McCormick, supra note 153, at 418, 423-24.
163. Id.
164. Using standard event-study methodology,James & Weir, supra note 152, at 12
(citing Brown & Warner, Using Daily Stock Returns: The Case of Event Studies, 14 J.
Fin. Econ. 3 (1985)), James and Weir compared the abnormal stock market returns of
those banks that acquired other banks in FDIC auctions with the stock market returns of
those banks that acquired other banks in normal market transactions, unaided by the
FDIC. Id. at 9-11. They found that winners of FDIC auctions enjoyed mean abnormal
returns of 2.36% for the two day period surrounding the auction. Id. at 13 (0.66% on
day -1 and 1.70% on day 0). James and Weir were able to estimate this gain to winners
of FDIC auctions with a high degree of statistical significance. Id. at 14. Their results
represent significantly greater returns to winners of FDIC auctions than to purchasers
who are unassisted by the FDIC. These figures are also significant for purposes of evalu-
ating the costs of the FDIC auction procedures. The figures show that the average gain
for winners of FDIC auctions to be about $6 million. Because the median gain to win-
ners is only $2 million, it seems clear that some winners gain far more. Bidders should
not expect to enjoy gains greater than the market average in a fully competitive bidding
process. Thus, these gains to bidders represent losses to the FDIC from its use of the
current auction process. Id.
Another measure of the costs of the current auction process compares the abnormal
returns to bidders with the number of bidders participating in the auction. French &
McCormick, supra note 153, at 423-24. Here, James & Weir found a negative relation
between the number of bidders and the gains to bidders. In other words, as the number
of bidders declines, the gains to bidders goes up. James & Weir, supra note 152, at 15.
They concluded that the data supports the hypothesis that FDIC auction procedures
result in wealth transfers from the FDIC to winning bidders. Id. at 20. The conclusion
that FDIC auction procedures are a costly means of disposing of failed banks' assets is
further supported by the fact that these procedures limit the potential competition for
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Another supposed benefit of the speed and secrecy associated with
the current approach is that it avoids the negative external effects that a
bank failure could have on other banks in the community. The argu-
ment is that even small delays suffered by some depositors in obtaining
funds will cause depositors as a group to lose confidence in the banking
system as a whole, and this will have a deleterious effect on the econ-
omy. However, this argument is without merit so long as the banking
system continues to stand behind insured depositors' accounts and to
provide adequate liquidity assistance. The public's confidence in bank-
ing derives from this government guarantee, not from any guarantees
made by the purchasers of the bank's assets. Similarly, the argument
that the delay harms depositors because it "can throw a wrench into the
financing of their activities" is untenable. Except in unusual cases, de-
lay limited to a few days is unlikely to impose serious inconvenience on
depositors. In addition, lenders would no doubt be willing to extend
credit to borrowers whose funds are temporarily tied up at an insolvent
bank if the United States government guarantees the ultimate repay-
ment of those funds.1 65
Indeed, when insolvent banks are liquidated by the FDIC in its re-
ceivership capacity there is necessarily some delay while the records of
insured deposit accounts are compiled and verified.166 The delay asso-
ciated with the auction process in a P&A or modified payout is not sig-
nificantly longer than the delay involved in a typical bank
liquidation. 167 In some cases the delay period may even be shorter. 168
For the same reasons, the benefits of the FDIC's policy of keeping
bank auctions secret do not appear to be offset by the costs involved.
So long as the funds of insured depositors are protected by the FDIC's
insurance fund, the closure of these banks pending an auction is un-
the assets of failed banks as well as the actual competition for these assets. Id. at 18.
This lack of potential competition may limit the returns to the FDIC on the assets it sells
during failed bank auctions. Id.
165. Clearly, small depositors may find it more difficult to obtain access to funds
during the interim period between failure and repayment than large depositors. The
FDIC obviously should be sensitive to the needs of small, insured depositors in failed
banks who need immediate access to funds to make home mortgage payment's, tuition
payments or other highly time-sensitive obligations. Indeed, the FDIC, like a private
insurance company, should be liable for consequential damages flowing from failure to
make timely payments to insured individuals.
166. According to FDIC officials, the delays generally stem from poor record keep-
ing and account documentation at certain insolvent banks. Ironically, the inconvenience
appears to fall disproportionately on small depositors because their records are often in
the greatest state of disarray. Interview, supra note 29.
167. See infra notes 170-82 and accompanying text (describing bank liquidation
procedures).
168. The delay period for an auction or modified payout is likely to be shorter in
cases where poor record keeping causes a lengthy delay for the verification of insured
deposit accounts. Liquidation may not occur until such records are compiled and veri-
fied, while mergers can take place beforehand, subject to later verification and settle-
ment of accounts. See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
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likely to cause widespread panic. Indeed, the FDIC's recent history of
using P&A transactions instead of paying off depositors in a liquidation
threatens to erode public confidence in the banking system because de-
positors do not have the opportunity to observe the FDIC making pay-
ments out of the insurance fund. When the public is able to observe
such payments being made, they come to understand the nature of the
deposit protection they enjoy and are unlikely to panic if the bank hold-
ing their deposits fails.' 69 Clearly at some point the costs to depositors
of delaying the final disposition of the bank's assets and liabilities will
come to equal or exceed the benefits in the form of higher auction re-
turns. The FDIC's goal should be to try and establish the equilibrium
that maximizes net returns. The available evidence suggests that the
current system, which downplays the goal of maximizing auction re-
turns and exalts the goal of depositor convenience, is inefficient. The
FDIC should close insolvent banks and publicly announce that it is con-
ducting an auction of the failed bank's assets and liabilities within the
week following the closing. And, in order to maximize the returns to
the FDIC from the bidding process, it should notify all eligible bidders
and give them an opportunity to submit a bid.
C. The Deposit Payoff
The deposit payoff is the most straightforward way to handle a
bank failure and the one that Congress envisioned would be used when
it devised the federal deposit insurance scheme in 1935.170 It is akin to
the straight liquidation that takes place in certain bankruptcy proceed-
ings.' 7 ' When the FDIC as receiver elects to dispose of the assets of a
failed bank by the deposit payoff method, it makes payments to each
depositor up to the amount of the FDIC insurance limit as soon as the
depositors submit proof of claims or otherwise satisfy the FDIC of their
creditor status. 172 Those depositors with accounts in excess of the in-
surance limit become general creditors of the failed bank for the
amount that their deposits exceed the insurance limit.
As the FDIC sells the assets of the failed bank, the uninsured de-
positors receive payments on the uninsured portions of their deposits
to the extent that funds become available to make such disbursements.
The uninsured depositors share these funds pro rata with the FDIC
which in its corporate capacity becomes a general creditor of the bank
169. See Garten, supra note 10, at 148 n.1 11 (describing speedy payments made by
the FDIC).
170. Indeed, the alternatives of open bank assistance and purchase and assumption
of failed bank assets had not even been invented when FDIG insurance was made
available.
171. See 11 U.S.G. § 726 (1982) (distribution of property of the estate).
172. 12 U.S.C. § 182 1(f) (1982) (If the FDIC is "not satisfied as to the validity" of a
depositor's claim, it may withhold payment until obtaining the "final determination of a
court of competent jurisdiction.").
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for the sums it previously has dispensed to insured depositors. 17
Uninsured depositors historically have received an average of 99.5
percent of their losses after completion of liquidation. 174 This level
suggests that such depositors exert a significant degree of influence on
banks and can protect themselves when their funds are genuinely at
risk. It also indicates that market discipline will not impose oppressive
costs on uninsured depositors. However, the recent trend away from
the use of the deposit payoff method of dealing with bank failure in
favor of options that protect uninsured depositors deprives the market
of the beneficial effects of such monitoring. 175
The high percentage of recovery by uninsured depositors makes
the current hostility towards the deposit payoff option even more curi-
ous. The typical complaints are that (1) all depositors, particularly un-
insured depositors, are inconvenienced because they must wait some
period of time before receiving payment;' 76 (2) a deposit payoff "dis-
rupts vital banking services"; 1 77 and (3) a deposit payoff is disruptive to
the overall economy since it requires that buildings be closed and bank
employees be terminated. 178
None of these complaints has merit. The inconvenience to depos-
itors is ordinarily not severe, particularly in comparison to the incon-
venience suffered by creditors in ordinary bankruptcy proceedings such
as a reorganization or liquidation that can take years. 179 Current poli-
cies ignore the regulatory benefits of causing depositors to suffer de-
lays. The cost of such delays will cause depositors to monitor the banks
where their funds are held. As such, it is entirely appropriate that unin-
sured depositors suffer greater losses in the form of the loss of use of
their funds than insured depositors because uninsured depositors are
in a much better position to monitor the performance of the bank.
As for the second point, vital banking services are not disrupted
when an insured bank is liquidated because most communities have a
plethora of banks. And, in those rare instances when the termination of
services of the bank will cause a disruption of vital banking services, the
FDIC has the authority to prop up the insolvent bank by direct invest-
ment even if this is not the least-cost method for handling the insol-
173. The FDIC is subrogated by force of law to the claims of the insured depositors
whose claims it has paid. Id. § 1821(g).
174. J. Sinkey, Problem and Failed Institutions in the Commercial Banking Industry
35 (1979).
175. See supra notes 125-35 and accompanying text (describing FDIC's preferred
method of dealing with insolvent banks).
176. See, e.g., Note, supra note 118, at 1355-56 ("all depositors must wait some
time to receive payments in a deposit payoff").
177. Id. at 1356.
178. Id.
179. Insured depositors typically are reimbursed out of the insurance fund within
five to seven days when the FDIC liquidates a bank. Garten, supra note 10, at 148. The
real cost to depositors comes in the form of lost post-failure interest. Id.
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vency. i80 With approximately 15,000 banks in the United States, the
argument that banks cannot be allowed to fail because each and every
bank in the country delivers "vital banking services" is impossible to
defend. In those rare communities where the banks' operations are es-
sential to the community, the statute permits exceptions to be made,
but this limited exception cannot support the current policy which
seems to presume that all banks are essential.
The third argument against deposit payoff is that it involves bank
closures and employee layoffs that disrupt the economy. However,
P&A transactions often result in these same unhappy occurrences since
the new management of the insolvent bank must, if the merger is to be
successful, rid the bank of redundant employees and unprofitable oper-
ations. Furthermore, very few bank assets are firm-specific. As such, if
there is a demand for the continued deployment of displaced bank em-
ployees and facilities in the banking industry, then other banking insti-
tutions will have an incentive to hire such employees and purchase such
assets rather than have them go to waste or, worse, be purchased by a
competitor. ' 8 1 The argument also contains the erroneous presumption
that bank failure policies should take into account values besides the
twin goals of protecting depositors and guarding the integrity of the
banking system. It should not. There is no reason for the FDIC's insur-
ance fund to subsidize inefficient or redundant banking operations.
Finally, improving the market for corporate control of banks best
assures that banking resources are allocated to their highest valuing
users.18 2 Consequently, those who are concerned about the allocation
of such resources should advocate restructuring the rules regulating
takeovers in those markets rather than advocate abandoning the de-
posit payoff system.
IV. THE CURRENT REGULATORY STRUCTURE: THE EFFICACY OF
MONITORING AND THE DESTRUCTIVE ROLE
OF BROKERED DEPosITs
A. Empirical Evidence
The above discussion of the benefits of depositor monitoring is
based on an elementary application of marginal cost analysis. Unin-
sured depositors can be expected to monitor banks and impose con-
straints on bank risk taking until the costs of engaging in such activities
equals the benefits. The benefits come in the form of a higher
probability of repayment by the bank. The costs come in the form of
the transaction costs involved in researching the solvency and future
prospects of banks and, in some cases drafting restrictions on bank in-
180. See supra notes 77-122 and accompanying text.
181. See infra note 252 and accompanying text (evidence indicates bank employees
do not lose jobs after mergers).
182. See infra notes 226-66 and accompanying text.
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vestment policies and in developing reporting systems which can moni-
tor the adherence to those agreements. If the FDIC does not protect
depositors over the $100,000 ceiling, banks will have an incentive to
devise ways to make credible promises such as posting bonds to assure
depositors that their funds will be secure.183
Despite the simplicity of the point, the desirability of increased de-
positor monitoring deserves further exploration. First, the cost-benefit
analysis described above must be altered in one significant respect. By
breaking up large deposits into a number of smaller deposits, large de-
positors can avoid the monitoring costs described above.'8 4 Breaking
up these deposits involves significant transaction costs, but recent tech-
nological developments and judicial decisions have made it increasingly
easy to break up large deposits into smaller, insured bundles. 8 5 Ac-
cording to Professor Scott, about 90 percent of all bank assets are fi-
nanced by deposits, of which 70 percent are insured.' 86 A growing
number of these insured deposits represents deposits of substantial size
that have been placed in insured institutions through deposit brokers
who take the large deposits, divide them into insurable sums, and place
them with the banks offering the highest rates of return to depositors.
This practice thus represents a threat to any plan that seeks to instill
depositor discipline on bank risk taking. 187
In addition to the problem of brokered deposits, it appears that the
particular form such monitoring takes has important policy implica-
tions. If, as some have claimed, monitoring by large depositors merely
manifests itself in the form of precipitous withdrawals of uninsured
funds on the basis of unfounded rumors, then depositor discipline may
be a net drag on the banking system.188 It has been argued that the low
cost of withdrawing funds means that depositors will not impose effec-
tive constraints on bank risk taking, but instead will use their informa-
tional advantage simply to withdraw funds in anticipation of an
upcoming bank failure.18 9
183. See Macey & Garrett, supra note 19, at 229-30, 238.
184. See FAIC Sec. v. United States, 768 F.2d 352, 355 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (discussing
"deposit splitting" among several different insured institutions by deposit brokers).
185. Id. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3509 (1982), established the Depository Institutions
Deregulation Committee to implement the elimination of interest rate ceilings on de-
posit accounts. This created an environment in which banks competed for deposit
finds. In addition to eliminating interest rate ceilings, the committee permitted banks
to pay fees to deposit brokers who obtained deposits for them. These changes, along
with the increasing ease of electronic transfers of large sums of money, led to the rise of
the deposit brokerage business.
186. Scott, The Future of Bank Regulation 268 in To Promote Prosperity: U.S.
Domestic Policy in the Mid-1980s (J. Moore ed. 1984).
187. Cf. Macey & Garrett, supra note 19, at 223-25 (describing benefits of market
discipline for controlling bank risk taking).
188. See Garten, supra note 10, at 153-57.
189. Id. at 153-54.
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This theory is unsupported empirically or theoretically. First,
while it is true that it is not very costly for uninsured depositors to with-
draw their funds, they must incur search costs in finding an alternative
repository for these funds. Second, the theory presupposes a "race"
among uninsured depositors to withdraw their money from a troubled
bank in order to avoid having deposits in the bank when all the bank's
liquid assets are gone. But the risk that a particular uninsured deposi-
tor will lose this race provides him with an incentive to engage in moni-
toring. Similarly, the threat of precipitous withdrawals provides
bankers with an incentive to provide uninsured depositors with current
information about the state of their bank-or to change the terms of
their contractual agreements with borrowers-in order to prevent such
withdrawals. As such, the threat of depositor withdrawal is more likely
to have a beneficial rather than a harmful effect on depositors.
The argument that monitoring by uninsured depositors will take
the form of bank runs also misses the point that bank runs are not
spontaneous events that occur randomly.190 Rather, they occur to
banks with badly managed loan portfolios or other excessive exposure
to risk.' 9 ' In other words, the evidence strongly indicates that bank
runs occur to banks that deserve such treatment by their depositors.
Consequently, the widespread withdrawal of funds by depositors
should be viewed as a healthy occurrence, not as a sign of market fail-
ure, because such runs demonstrate that depositors are monitoring the
banks in which their deposits are kept.' 92
There are two sources of empirical support for the proposition that
uninsured depositors who face a genuine risk of loss provide a healthy,
not a destructive, monitoring function on banks. First, if uninsured de-
positors are concerned about excessive risk taking, they will demand
190. T. Hannan & G. Hanweck, Bank Insolvency Risk and the Market for Large
Certificates of Deposit (Fin. Structure Section, Division of Res. and Statistics, Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Working Paper in Banking, Finance, and
Microeconomics No. 86-1, April 1986) (observing interest rate data for CD's of five dif-
ferent maturities at 300 different banks and concluding that the market does exact a
price for risk taking); Short, Bank Problems and Financial Safety Nets, Econ. Rev., The
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, March 1987, at 17, 25-26 (noting evidence suggesting
depositors, at least of medium- and small-sized banks, demand higher risk premiums
from problem banks); cf. Baer & Brewer, Uninsured Deposits as a Source of Market
Discipline: Some New Evidence, Econ. Persp., Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago,
Sept./Oct. 1986, at 23 (examining ratio of equity market value to total assets, and vari-
ance of returns on bank equity, and concluding that uninsured depositors can exert dis-
cipline "even when banks are solvent").
191. See Cates, Management Discipline: The True Bulwark Against Banking Cri-
sis, Issues in Bank Reg., Winter, 1985, at 4, 4-5.
192. This is consistent with the argument that it is not costless for depositors to
remove their funds from a bank, since the depositors must incur search costs in finding
another bank. Macey & Garrett, supra note 19, at 230. In a world of zero search costs, it
would be cheaper for uninsured depositors to shift their accounts upon hearing any
rumors regarding the bank's solvency rather than attempting to verify the validity of the
rumor, provided they can find another bank offering the same rate of return.
1988] 1195
HeinOnline -- 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1195 1988
COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW
that bank shareholders bear a significant share of potential losses by
capitalizing their banks with a high proportion of equity. Thus, if mar-
ket discipline by depositors has been eroding, we should expect capital
reserves to be declining. Recent research indicates that the current re-
liance on federal deposit insurance has resulted in a decrease of banks'
capital cushions as well as of their loan-loss reserves. 193 These changes
are very likely to increase the risk of insolvency.194
Kaufman's evidence is particularly significant because it indicates
that the market discipline provided by depositors does not only mani-
fest itself ex post through massive withdrawals but ex ante as well
through the contracting process. Prior to the present era of de facto
insurance, shareholders were induced to reduce risk by putting up a
significant equity cushion of their own funds and by providing substan-
tial loan-loss reserves to guard against unforeseen contingencies. The
equity cushion and the loan-loss reserves represent credible precom-
mitment promises made by shareholders to persuade risk-averse depos-
itors to entrust their funds with the shareholders' bank.
The federal banking agencies have attempted to mimic this market-
place response by imposing capital adequacy requirements on deposi-
tory institutions.195 As with other regulatory strategies designed to
reduce risk taking, government-imposed capital adequacy rules are un-
likely to be good substitutes for the equity cushion that would result
from the interplay of market forces. 196
Another precommitment strategy that has been abandoned con-
cerned the liability of bank shareholders for the debts incurred by their
firm. In the standard corporate contract, shareholders of a firm are not
193. See Simmons, Annual Conference Assesses Banking Risk, Econ. Persp., Fed.
Reserve Bank of Chicago, Sept./Oct. 1986, at 19 (reporting on Professor George G.
Kaufman's study).
194. E.g., C. Henning, W. Pigott & R. Scott, Financial Markets and the Economy
71-72 (4th ed. 1984) (explaining how capital accounts relate to bank safety in that
"safety is provided.., by having enough capital that any probable losses on loans can be
charged off against capital").
195. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency, Definition of Capital to be Used in Determining Capital Ade-
quacy of National and State Member Banks and Bank Holding Companies, Press Release
(Feb. 1981), reprinted in E. Symons &J. White, supra note 44, at 289-91.
196. See Macey & Garrett, supra note 19, at 221-22 (explaining why "even consci-
entious regulators with the best intentions are likely to produce regulations that provide
a sub-optimal level of safety for the banking system as a whole").
In addition, minimum capital requirements do not fall into that category of issues
for which government regulation is advisable because a simple, uniform, and easily ad-
ministrable rule can not be promulgated to cover all situations. Capitalization con-
stantly changes as investors shift their funds among alternative investments. In addition,
the capital structure of individual banks depends on such diverse things as the economic
prospects of the bank, the competitive conditions within the community served by the
bank, the risks inherent in the bank's assets, the amount of the bank's fixed asset invest-
ment, and the ability of investors to supply additional capital when needed. 1 M. Malloy,
supra note 39, at 441 (describing federal guidelines for initial capitalizations of banks).
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exposed to liability in excess of their initial capital investment. In the
past, however, shareholders of banks have agreed to face liability in ex-
cess of this initial investment, by agreeing to supply additional funds
(up to an amount equal to the par value of their stock) if necessary to
protect depositors and other creditors.' 97
Prior to the present era of de facto insurance for all bank deposi-
tors, this arrangement may have had certain desirable features from the
perspective of both depositors and shareholders. Depositors benefited
from the increased level of safety for their funds, and shareholders ben-
efited because the banks in which they invested enjoyed a lower cost of
capital as a result of their promise.' 98 Under current market condi-
tions, however, shareholders have no incentive to make such a guaran-
tee to depositors; de facto deposit insurance provides depositors with
the assurances they need. The problem is that the strong incentives
that shareholders previously had to avoid excessive risk taking are no
longer in place. Shareholders' risk of loss is lower, therefore we can
expect them to take greater risks.
Other empirical evidence provides a second level of support for
the proposition that uninsured depositors provide a healthy form of
market discipline for banks. A recent study by Baer and Brewer' 99 sug-
gests that holders of large denomination certificates of deposit (CDs)
will demand higher rates of return on these certificates if the stock re-
turns of the bank with whom they are placing their funds exhibits high
volatility200-a strong proxy for risk.20' Because higher rates on CDs
reflect higher capital costs for shareholders, shareholders have an in-
centive to refrain from engaging in excessive risk taking in order to
keep their cost of capital low. Or, put another way, if fixed claimants
bear the risk of loss, in a competitive capital market they will pass these
costs on to equity claimants by charging them higher rates of inter-
est.20 2 Thus, the studies concerning the rates on uninsured CDs are
stong evidence that risk monitoring has healthy rather than deleterious
effects on bank safety because they show that shareholders bear the
costs of bank riskiness when there are uninsured depositors. Rational
shareholders will force their banks to engage in safe practices in order
to avoid the cost of riskiness, which comes in the form of high CD rates.
High CD rates for risky banks are also strong evidence that depositors
197. P. Blumberg, The Law of Corporate Groups 47-49 (1987).
198. Note, however, that double-liability rules face serious problems of enforceabil-
ity if shareholders are widely dispersed.
199. Baer & Brewer, supra note 190.
200. Id. at 29.
201. For useful introductory materials on stock price volatility as a proxy for risk,
see &enerally V. Brudney & M. Chirelstein, Cases and Materials on Corporate Finance
75-113 (3d ed. 1987).
202. See Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 334-37 (1976).
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engage in monitoring, because if they did not monitor, they would not
know enough to demand higher CD rates.
Similarly, Baer and Brewer show that CD owners demand higher
rates of return when the market value of a firm's equity is low relative to
the bank's total assets.203 This too is evidence of market discipline at
work because as the market value of a bank's equity goes up in relation
to the total value of its assets, uninsured depositors enjoy a greater
cushion in the event of financial trouble. As in the case of share-price
volatility, this evidence shows that shareholders pay a cost for engaging
in risk taking when uninsured depositors face a risk of loss. As these
costs go up, one must expect the incidence of risk taking to decline.
These data support the proposition that uninsured depositors exert
discipline throughout the period when their money is in the bank's
hands.
Further evidence in support of the efficacy of uninsured depositors
as continuing monitors comes from a study by Hannon and Hanweck
which examined the rates of return on CDs of five different maturi-
ties. 20 4 They found that the risk premiums on these CDs in the secon-
dary market increases with the ratio of risky assets to total bank capital.
In addition, Hannon and Hanweck found that CD risk premiums in-
crease as uncertainty about bank returns on assets goes up. 20 5 As one
commentator has pointed out, "the implication [of the Hannon and
Hanweck study] is that the market for large CDs helps to discipline
bank risk-taking." 20 6 These results are consistent with earlier, more
tentative results showing that interest rates on large, uninsured CDs
increase as the amount of a bank's risky assets increases relative to the
bank's capital. 20 7
The available evidence also suggests that the market provides a
very good early warning of bank problems. For example, a study by
Pettway and Sinkey of six bank failures that occurred between 1973 and
1975 found that the market signalled problems with all of these banks
an average of thirty-three weeks before regulatory agencies placed
them on problem lists.208 Similarly, a study by Johnson and Weber in-
203. The ratio of market value of equity to total assets is called the market-to.asset
ratio. Baer & Brewer, supra note 190, at 26-29. Baer and Brewer find that one standard
deviation increase in the market-to-asset ratio causes CD rates to fall by 17 basis points.
Id. at 31, table 4. A similar increase in CD rates follows a decline in a bank's market-to-
asset ratio. Id.
204. T. Hannan & G. Hanweck, supra note 190, at 2 (finding "strong evidence that
the market for [large certificates of deposit] exacts a price for bank risk taking").
205. See id. at 18.
206. Baer & Brewer, supra note 190, at 30.
207. Goldberg & Lloyd-Davies, Standby Letters of Credit: Are Banks Overex-
tending Themselves?, 16J. Bank Res. 29-39 (1985); C. Herzig-Marx & A. Weaver, Bank
Soundness and the Market for Large Negotiable Certificates of Deposit (Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago, Staff Memorandum No. 79-1, 1979).
208. Pettway & Sinkey, Establishing On-Site Bank Examination Priorities: An
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dicates that the addition of a bank to a regulator's problem bank list
does not cause a significant market reaction,20 9 indicating that the mar-
ket has already reacted to this information by the time the regulators
act. Similarly, when the names of banks on the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency's list of problem banks were leaked to the press there was no
significant market reaction to the disclosure, indicating that the market
already knew the regulator's information. And a study by Shick and
Sherman showed that stock prices of bank holding companies began to
decline 15 months before regulators recognized that the subsidiary
banks were experiencing financial trouble.210
Furthermore, the risk of widespread withdrawal of funds by unin-
sured depositors may have the added beneficial effect of inducing regu-
lators to hasten the closure of troubled banks, thus saving the FDIC
insurance fund further strain. Widespread withdrawals provide regula-
tors with early information that a bank is in difficulty. If a bank can be
closed as soon as it is economically insolvent-when the present value
of its assets net of liquidation costs equals the present market value of
its liabilities-the loss to the insurance fund from the bank failure will
be zero.211 When there is delay between the moment of economic in-
solvency and closure, insolvent institutions with nothing to lose have a
strong incentive to take imprudent risks in an attempt to regain sol-
vency.212 This strategy, while perfectly rational from the shareholder's
perspective, generally will increase the magnitude of the payout neces-
sary by the FDIC2 13 because, in all likelihood, the strategy will succeed
only in a small percentage of cases.
This evidence strongly supports the underpinnings of the theory
articulated thus far. Uninsured depositors are a valuable source of
market discipline for banks. When uninsured depositors face a realistic
possibility of significant economic loss from a bank failure, they will
cause banks to make credible precommitment promises to refrain from
excessive risk-taking, and they will continue their supervision so long as
their funds are on deposit with the bank.
B. Brokered Deposits
A significant impediment to controlling the moral hazard 214 prob-
Early-Warning System Using Accounting and Market Information, 35 J. Fin. 137, 145
(1980).
209. Johnson & Weber, The Impact of the Problem Bank Disclosure on Bank Share
Prices, 8J. Bank Res. 179, 180-82 (1977).
210. Shick & Sherman, Bank Stock Prices as an Early Warning System for Changes
in Condition, 11 J. Bank Res. 136 (1980).
211. Kaufman, supra note 20, at 10.
212. Id. at 9.
213. See id.
214. "Moral hazard" refers to the problem of an insured person's having less in-
centive to reduce risk than an uninsured person simply because he is insured. R.
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 150 (3d ed. 1986). More formally, moral hazard re-
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lem by improving private sector monitoring of FDIC insured banks
comes from the recent growth of a new form of business enterprise, the
deposit brokerage firm. Deposit brokers earn fees by bringing together
individual depositors and arranging for the placement of their separate
funds in whichever insured financial institutions currently offer the
highest rates of return to depositors. 215
Brokered deposits pose problems for the banking system in several
ways. First, they make it easier for the shareholders and other control-
ling persons of troubled banks to engage in excessive risk taking imme-
diately before failure. Insured institutions on the brink of insolvency
have an incentive to take imprudent risks in an attempt to regain sol-
vency. 216 But, because troubled banks frequently face severe liquidity
problems, they are unable to obtain the funds necessary to engage in
the last minute risk-taking. Access to brokered deposits by such institu-
tions provides them with a plentiful source of relatively inexpensive
funds to fuel their last ditch ventures. Second, even under the current
regulatory system, depositors with funds above the de jure insurance
threshold have an incentive to engage in a minimal degree of monitor-
ing because there is some uncertainty in the administration of the cur-
rent regulatory scheme. It is always possible that the regulators will
change their strategy and refuse to bail out uninsured depositors.
There is also a remote possibility that the regulators will be unable to
find a suitable merger partner for a failed bank at the last minute and
may not be able to consummate a P&A transaction. If it is then decided
that the bank is not essential to its community, the regulators may liqui-
date the bank through a cash payout, leaving uninsured depositors un-
fers to the fact that certain forms of insurance cause a divergence between the private
marginal cost of a particular action (i.e., the incremental cost to the insured party) and
the social cost (i.e., the cost borne by the pool of insured parties) of that action, thus
resulting in a suboptimal allocation of resources. The example often given is the British
National Health Service, which is said to have led to the overuse of medical facilities,
since the cost of using such facilities to the individual patient is shifted from the patient
to society. The Dictionary of Modem Economics 298 (D. Pearce ed. 1983).
215. See FAIG Sec. v. United States, 768 F.2d 352, 355 (D.C. Gir. 1985). See gen-
erally Benston, Brokered Deposits and Deposit Insurance Reform, Issues in Bank Reg.,
Spring 1984, at 17 (examination of different views toward brokered deposits).
Sometimes deposit brokers match banks with depositors and arrange for the depos-
itors to deposit their money directly with the bank. FAIC Sec., 768 F.2d at 355. Other
times the broker deposits the funds on behalf of the depositor. Id. In both cases the
depositors enjoy the benefits of federal deposit insurance so long as their deposits with
one lending institution do not exceed the $100,000 statutory limit. Id.
Some deposit brokers specialize in splitting funds from large investors into
$100,000 increments that can be placed with insured banks in order to permit all of the
investor's funds to qualify for federal deposit insurance. Id. Deposit brokers generally
place funds with particular banks on behalf of several customers, and thus the amount
placed by brokers with one institution typically exceeds $100,000. Id.
216. Shareholders will gamble here because they stand to lose nothing more than
their initial investment if the bank still fails. If they do not act, that investment is certain
to be lost.
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protected. Even if the odds of such events taking place are small, they
impose some risk on uninsured depositors, who in turn impose disci-
pline on the banks with whom they have deposited their funds. But, as
the transaction costs of splitting up these large deposits into insurable
increments goes down, they will be split up and will destroy even this
modicum of market discipline that exists under the current regulatory
scheme. 217 The FDIC and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLB) share the opinion that brokered deposits in failed financial in-
stitutions have exacerbated demands on the relevant federally spon-
sored bank insurance funds.2 18
Finally, the emergence of brokered deposits puts subtle strains on
the banking system by fueling the incentives that banks currently have
to shift to even riskier ventures. Deposit brokers compete with each
other for customers with funds to deposit by searching for those banks
that offer the highest rates of return to depositors. Because of deposit
insurance, these deposit brokers and their customers are unconcerned
about the risks associated with the banks that hold these deposits. As
such, the continued use of deposit brokers will cause a flight of funds to
the banks that offer depositors the highest rates of return-the riskiest
banks. Other banks, to attract funds, will have to match the high rates
being offered by these risky banks. In order to cover the higher margi-
nal costs of funds, these banks, in turn, will be forced to shift their as-
sets to riskier ventures. Thus, the emergence of deposit brokers
provides banks with an even stronger incentive to shift their funds to
riskier ventures.
In an effort to deal with the problem of brokered deposits, the
FDIC and the FHLB promulgated regulations that would aggregate all
of the deposits placed at a single bank by a particular deposit broker-
regardless of the beneficial owner of the funds-for the purpose of
computing the FDIC insurance limit.2 19 In an opinion later affirmed by
217. Macey & Garrett, supra note 19, at 225.
218. See FAIC Sec., 768 F.2d at 355-56. The problem is that:
[b]anks or S & L's bordering on insolvency can, by offering high interest rates,
attract large sums in a very short period in an effort to stave off failure of the
institution. Because the brokered accounts are federally insured.., neither the
brokers nor their customers adequately investigate the institution's financial
condition before depositing their funds. The result, when the bank or S & L is
unable to stave off failure, is that the potential cost to the insuring agencies of
making payment on the insured accounts is significantly increased due to the
last-minute influx of brokered deposits.
FAIC Sec. v. United States, 595 F. Supp. 73, 76 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd, 768 F.2d 352 (D.C.
Cir. 1985).
219. FAIC Sec., 595 F. Supp. at 76. Thus, if ten people placed $20,000 each with a
deposit broker, who in turn placed the money with one bank, the $100,000 insurance
limit would be surpassed by $100,000 under the new regulations. In this situation only
$100,000 of the depositors' funds would be insured. See id. at 76. The regulations did
not confront the interesting question of how the insurance would be apportioned
among these various depositors in the event the bank failed. See id. at 77 n.4.
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the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, a U.S. District Court in
FAIC Securities, Inc. v. United States struck down the regulation as being in
violation of the Banking Act of 1935.220 The court construed the Act to
mean that beneficial owners of deposit accounts are entitled to insur-
ance protection up to the statutory limit. The court therefore decided
that the banking regulators lacked the administrative authority to de-
prive insurance protection to single depositors whose funds did not ex-
ceed the statutory limits.
2 2 1
In the wake of FAIC Securities, legislation granting the FDIC and the
FHLB authority to impose constraints on brokered deposits is clearly
appropriate. The present ability of deposit brokers to use modem
technology to exploit the deposit insurance system greatly exacerbates
the moral hazard problem facing troubled financial institutions. In-
deed, the ability of deposit brokers to transform uninsured deposits
into insured deposits will seriously reduce the effectiveness of the regu-
latory changes advocated above. The ability to convert large, unin-
sured deposits into smaller, insured deposits will provide large
depositors with an even greater incentive to seek out the riskiest banks
and place their money with those banks to enjoy the highest returns. In
turn, safer banks, to compete for funds, will have to offer higher rates
to depositors. And, to justify paying depositors these higher rates of
return, these safer banks will be forced to invest in riskier projects.
V. THE MARKET FOR BANK-CONTROL
Whatever one's view about the desirability of exposing large de-
positors to increased risk of loss in order to increase the level of moni-
toring that insured banks receive, it is clear that deposit insurance
makes banks different from other business firms because a large class of
claimants-depositors-are protected from the consequences of mak-
ing bad capital allocation decisions by a pervasive insurance scheme for
which they do not pay directly. This insurance scheme makes it impos-
sible to apply the basic principles of corporate finance theory directly to
federally insured depository institutions.
A basic tenet of the modern theory of corporate finance is that a
business firm is a complex web of contractual relationships among
shareholders, directors, officers, employees, creditors, and others.222
Each of these groups agrees to invest their capital (which may come in
the form of both money and labor) in the firm in exchange for the pros-
pect of a market rate of return on its investment.223 Those groups that
bear greater risk must be compensated for this increased risk-bearing.
220. Id. at 77-79.
221. Id. at 78-79.
222. See Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica (n.s.) 386 (1937).
223. See Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent De-
velopments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. Rev. 913, 917-18 (1982).
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One of the most trenchant forms of risk that faces investors is the
risk that the interests of managers, directors, and other employees of a
public corporation will diverge sharply from those of the shareholders
and other investors. Many of the contracts in the corporate sphere are
designed to control non-optimal risk-taking224 and to align the inter-
ests of managers with those of the shareholders and other claimants. 225
In the bank setting there is far less incentive to design such contracts
because the federal government, through the federal deposit insurance
scheme, has agreed to bear the risks associated with the most acute
form of non-optimal performance-failure.
Unfortunately, it is not the federal deposit insurance system alone
that leads to insufficient monitoring and hence to sub-optimal manage-
rial performance. Federal banking regulation, by virtually forbidding
hostile takeovers, removes an equally powerful market mechanism that
exerts a corrective influence on managerial misbehavior-the market
for bank control.
This section first reviews the mechanism by which the market for
corporate control, particularly the tender offer, serves as a mechanism
for monitoring the performance of errant management teams when this
market process is not constrained by the types of regulations that cur-
rently pervade the world of banking. It is shown that the market for
corporate control, if allowed to function properly, would serve to im-
prove managerial performance by bank managers in the same way as
would permitting large depositors to suffer losses from bank failures:
by providing private parties with an economic incentive to monitor
management. The complex system of regulation that governs the mar-
ket for control of banks is then reviewed in order to show that these
regulations significantly reduce the possibility that a bank can be ac-
quired in a hostile takeover-regardless of how bad the performance of
its incumbent management has been. Finally, we suggest ways that reg-
ulators can improve the operation of this market so as to provide an
additional source of monitoring of banks by outsiders.
A. The Theory of the Market for Bank Control
In some respects, tender offers for firms provide an even more at-
tractive prospect for improving managerial discipline than contracts be-
tween firms and shareholders or contracts between creditors and firms.
Creditors and shareholders cannot provide the same level of monitor-
ing as outside bidders because they are plagued by free rider problems
that reduce their incentives to monitor. Specifically, those shareholders
and creditors who engage in monitoring of their firm's management
224. See generally Smith & Warner, supra note 32, at 136-39 (how covenants are
means whereby fixed claimants control risk taking by debtor firms).
225. See Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and
Evidence, 9 Del.J. Corp. L. 540, 543 (1984).
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bear all of the costs of such monitoring, while the benefits are dispersed
among all creditors and shareholders according to the amount of their
investments. 226 Those who enjoy the benefits of monitoring without
paying are free riders, and such free riding leads to a suboptimal level
of monitoring.227
Furthermore, as discussed above, while monitoring by creditors
takes place throughout the duration of a creditor's relationship with the
firm, ex ante monitoring is in many ways more socially desirable than
ex post monitoring.228 Ex ante monitoring consists of drafting con-
tracts and forging credible precommitment strategies that constrain
managerial misbehavior.229 For banks, ex post monitoring by creditors
comes in the form of bank runs and demands for risk premiums as com-
pensation for excessive risk taking.230 Here, too, collective action
problems take their toll as each creditor realizes that the optimal strat-
egy is to be the first to withdraw his funds, thereby leading to the dan-
ger of premature deposit withdrawals.
Easterbrook and Fischel point out that the societal benefits from a
robust market for corporate control far exceed the benefits to particu-
lar bidders and target firm shareholders because the monitoring by bid-
ders "poses a continuous threat of takeover if performance lags."1231
The consequence of this continuous threat is that "managers will...
reduce agency costs in order to reduce the chance of takeover, and the
process of reducing agency costs leads to higher prices for shares." 23 2
Weaker firms are particularly likely candidates for takeover, since
they are likely to provide the greatest opportunity for arbitrage profits
by superior management teams. Indeed, in an insight that is particu-
larly relevant for banking law and policy, Professor Dewey observes
that takeovers are "merely a civilized alternative to bankruptcy or the
voluntary liquidation that transfers assets from falling to rising
firms."' 233 Thus, when properly viewed as a substitute for bankruptcy, a
robust market for bank control is seen as a sign of the vigor of competi-
226. Cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 Yale L.J. 698,
703-15 (1982) (discussing uneven distributions of wealth in shifts in corporate control).
227. Id. at 710.
228. See Macey & Garrett, supra note 19, at 228-32, 238.
229. Id. at 229-30.
230. Id. at 230-31.
231. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Re-
sponding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1174 (1981).
232. Id.; see also Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corpo-
rate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1978)
(arguing threat of takeover gives managers incentive to remain efficient and to keep
share prices high); Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. Pol.
Econ. 110, 112-13 (1965) (discussing relationship between managerial efficiency, stock
prices, and takeover motivation).
233. Dewey, Mergers & Cartels: Some Reservations About Policy, 51 Am. Econ.
Rev. Paper and Prac. 255, 257 (1961).
[Vol. 88:11531204
HeinOnline -- 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1204 1988
BANK FAILURES
tion in a particular industry, rather than of its decline. 234 Manne, in a
seminal article, made a substantial extension of Dewey's earlier in-
sights. He observed that takeovers are not only efficient when the fail-
ure of a firm is imminent, but also "before bankruptcy becomes
imminent in order to avoid that eventuality. ' 23 5 Manne goes on to
point out that "if mergers were completely legal, we should anticipate
relatively few actual bankruptcy proceedings in any industry which was
not itself contracting. The function so wastefully performed by bank-
ruptcies and liquidations would be economically performed by mergers
at a much earlier stage of the firm's life."'236 Manne's defense of the
market for corporate control catalogues a host of advantages to the
economy from a regulatory policy that encourages takeovers. A free
market for corporate control would bring about more efficient manage-
ment of firms, increased protection for non-controlling investors-
stockholders, depositors, and other creditors-and a more efficient al-
location of resources. 237
The arguments in support of a robust market for corporate control
apply with even greater force to banks than they do for corporations
generally. The monitoring function that the corporate control market
provides for all firms is a supplement to the monitoring conducted by
unsecured creditors in the non-FDIC insured public corporation. Be-
cause depositors have very little incentive to engage in monitoring
under the current regulatory regime, which protects virtually all depos-
its, the need for a robust market for corporate control is even more
acute in banking than in other sectors of the economy.
The observations of Dewey and Manne that the market for corpo-
rate control both serves as a substitute for bankruptcy and reduces the
incidence of insolvency are particularly relevant for the banking indus-
try. If creditors and shareholders make uninsured investments in a firm
that becomes insolvent, they bear virtually all of the costs of the insol-
vency. But if an FDIC insured bank becomes insolvent, much of the
costs are borne not by shareholders and uninsured creditors of the
failed institution, but by the FDIC insurance fund. FDIC deposit insur-
234. Id. This does not mean that takeovers of banks will only occur when failure is
imminent. Rather, takeovers are likely to take place whenever a firm is being run by
inept or dishonest management, even if the firm happens to be profitable. See Haddock,
Macey & McChesney, Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 Va.
L. Rev. 701, 709 (1987). It stands to reason, however, that all else being equal, firms
with inept or dishonest management are more likely to fail than firms with competent,
honest management.
Takeovers also are likely to occur when a firm's assets could be redeployed to more
valuable uses than the ones selected by incumbent management. Macey, State Anti-
Takeover Legislation and the National Economy, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 467, 469.
235. Manne, supra note 232, at 111.
236. Id. at 112.
237. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 226, at 698; Haddock, Macey &
McChesney, supra note 234, at 709.
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ance and the FDIC bank failure policies cause bank insolvency to im-
pose costs on the healthy banks whose premiums constitute the FDIC
insurance fund. These externalities provide even stronger arguments
than otherwise for facilitating a robust market for corporate control in
order to reduce the incidence of bank failure.
The administrative costs of bankruptcy are an example of an insol-
vency-related expense that is borne, at least in part, by third parties in
the case of bank insolvencies. These expenses, which vary greatly de-
pending on a variety of factors, can be quite large.23 8 The expenses are
borne by the claimants of the insolvent firm because they reduce the
size of the asset pool which such claimants will share. The FDIC and
other government agencies are in complete charge of the bank insol-
vency process, and these agencies incur significant costs in connection
with this process. A robust market for bank control would cause the
cost of transferring control of bank assets to fall on the parties who
benefit from the transaction-the purchasers and sellers of the firm.
This point becomes particularly clear when the tender offer pro-
cess in the normal course of a firm's business is compared with the P&A
transaction.23 9 If possible, when an FDIC insured bank becomes insol-
vent, the regulators hurriedly arrange an auction for the failed bank's
assets. The speed and the necessarily restricted nature of the auction
process imposes heavy costs on the FDIG. In fact, the P&A transaction
is nothing other than a last ditch effort by regulators to create a robust
market for bank control when a bank has already failed. If administra-
tors permitted a more robust control market for banks that have not
been officially declared insolvent, not only would they avoid the admin-
istrative costs of the P&A transactions, but the monitoring conducted
by potential bidders would prompt incumbent management to perform
better in order to avoid being displaced in a takeover. 240 This in turn
238. Ang, Chua, & McConnell, The Administrative Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy,
37 J. Fin. 219, 224 (1982). Ang, Chua, and McConnell examined a randomly selected
sample of eighty-six bankruptcy liquidation cases filed in the Western District of
Oklahoma and found the ratio of administrative costs to total value of the firm to have a
mean of 7.5% and a median of 1.5%. Id.; see also Altman, A Further Empirical Investi-
gation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question, 39 J. Fin. 1067 (1984). Altman compared the
bankruptcy liquidation costs of firms in the retail industry with the liquidation costs of
industrial firms. He found the ratio of bankruptcy administrative expenses to the value
of the firm to have a mean of 4.0% for the retail firms and a mean of 9.8% for the
industrial group. Id. at 1074-75.
239. See supra notes 123-35 and accompanying text (describing P&A
transactions).
240. While the administrative costs of purchase and assumption transactions are
avoided when there is a merger or hostile takeover of a bank, there is still a danger that
bank managers will use the resources of the bank to try to fight off unwanted tender
offers. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 231, at 1174-82 (arguing that the target
managers should not be allowed to resist hostile takeover attempts since such attempts
improve the quality of corporate governance and move corporate assets to their most
highly valuing users). But the costs of such resistance are borne by bank shareholders,
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would result in fewer bank failures overall.
Of course, markets do not work perfectly. Even with a healthy
market for bank control some (although fewer) banks will become in-
solvent. Transactions costs and information costs will make it ineffi-
cient for outsiders to search and bid for all undervalued or inefficiently
managed banks. Even when the regulators declare a bank insolvent,
however, a functioning market for bank control would facilitate dispos-
ing of the failed bank's assets. If a market for bank control were al-
lowed to develop, individuals and firms would develop specialized
expertise in locating and evaluating poorly managed banks, just as they
have in the market for corporate control generally.2 41 Such firms and
individuals-often pejoratively described as "raiders"-would improve
the operation of the auction market for the assets of banks that the reg-
ulators have declared insolvent and that the FDIC is attempting to sell
in a P&A transaction. This too would reduce the costs of bank failure.
The empirical evidence overwhelmingly supports the theory of the
market for corporate control presented here and also serves to quell
the oft-heard complaints2 42 that takeovers are exploitive of target firms
and that the gains from takeovers represent mere wealth transfers from
one class of claimants to another. Indeed, there have been so many
studies proving large gains to target firms from takeovers, that it is even
difficult to catalogue the articles that review the various studies.
2 4 a
A famous review article by Jensen and Ruback looked at thirteen
studies on the gains from tender offers that occurred between 1977 and
1981. The thirteen studies all showed that targets of successful tender
offers and mergers earn significant, positive rates of return, ranging
who must decide for themselves if the benefit from additional resistance, which comes in
the form of higher premia for their stock, outweighs the cost, which comes in the form of
a lower probability that an initial bid ever will be made for the target firm's stock.
Haddock, Macey & McChesney, supra note 234, at 720-26 (arguing that shareholders
bear these costs). Thus the problem of excessive managerial resistance seems over-
stated. Id.
241. See Macey & McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95
Yale L.J. 13, 28-29 (1985) (arguing that prospective tender offerors make investments in
locating undervalued firms and are subject to "victimization by others who can free-ride
on the information produced").
242. For a sampling of articles that raise questions about the desirability of the
market for corporate control, see, e.g., Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate
Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84
Colum. L. Rev. 1145 (1984); Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the
Corporate Web, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1986) [hereinafter Coffee, Shareholders Versus
Managers]; McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. of Corp. Law 205 (1988);
McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. Law. 413 (1986).
243. The classic article in the field is Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate
Control, The Scientific Evidence, 11J. Fin. Econ. 5 (1983) (reviewing over a dozen sepa-
rate studies); see also Jarrell, Brickly & Netter, The Market for Corporate Control: The
Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2J. Econ. Persp. 49 (1988) (arguing target firms gain in
a successful takeover); Jensen, Takeovers: Folklore and Science, Harv. Bus. Rev.,
Nov.-Dec. 1984, at 109 (arguing criticism of takeover market is unfounded).
1988] 1207
HeinOnline -- 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1207 1988
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
from sixteen percent for mergers to thirty percent for tender offers.244
Jensen and Ruback conclude that the evidence supports the hypothesis
that corporate acquisitions represent positive net-present-value
projects. 245 A recent study by several financial economists with experi-
ence at the Security and Exchange Commission's (SEC) Office of the
Chief Economist estimates total premiums to target firm shareholders
of over $54 billion dollars from 1981 to 1986.246
The scientific evidence is completely at odds with the theory that
target firms are exploited by takeovers; instead, the most recent evi-
dence continues to support the hypothesis that target firms benefit
from takeovers. The Office of the Chief Economist studied all of the
successful tender offers that occurred between 1981 and 1984 and
found that target firm shareholders of such takeovers enjoyed a 53.2%o
increase in the value of their shares, net of the market average. 24
7
Thus, as a recent study byJarrell, Brickley, and Netter points out, "the
evidence reported thus far indicates substantial gains to target
shareholders." 248
The empirical evidence also discredits the view that takeovers rep-
resent attempts by bidding firms to exploit target firms. 249 Regardless
244. Jensen & Ruback, supra note 243, at 11-13.
245. Id. at 47.
246. Jarrell, Brickley & Netter, supra note 243, at 49.
247. Id. at 52.
248. Id.
249. TheJensen and Ruback study shows that the returns to bidding firms is signifi-
cantly smaller than the returns to targets, Jensen & Ruback, supra note 243 at 11-13,
indicating that the sharing of gains between bidders and targets does not represent the
systematic exploitation of targets by bidders. Jarrell, Brickley & Netter, supra note 243,
at 53-54. Recent evidence concerning the gains to bidders in tender offers is presented
in a 1987 study by Jarrell and Poulson. Jarrell & Poulson, The Returns to Acquiring
Firms in Tender Offers: Evidence from Three Decades (1987) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file at the Columbia Law Review). They show that while bidders do realize
small gains, in recent years their share of these gains has been declining. Id.
The evidence supports alternative hypotheses for why bidders realize smaller gains
than targets. The most plausible explanation is that the market for takeovers has be-
come increasingly competitive over the years, and this rivalrous competition manifests
itself in the emergence of a market that more closely resembles auctions than single-
buyer/single-seller transactions. Jarrell, Brickley & Netter, supra note 243, at 54.
Richard Roll presents an alternative explanation, called the "hubris hypothesis" which
posits that takeovers represent empire building by the management teams of bidding
firms. Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59J. Bus. 197 (1986). An-
other theory is that bidders do gain from taking over other firms, but that these gains
may not be reflected in the current studies due to problems with the testing methodol-
ogy. Macey, supra note 234. Specifically, present testing methodology only recognizes
gains to bidders that occur within a relatively short period preceding an acquisition. Id.
If the stock market is efficient, the gains to bidders from an acquisition may be antici-
pated well in advance of the acquisition itself and thus are not reflected by the current
statistical technique. Id.; see also Malatesta, The Wealth Effect of Merger Activity and
the Objective Functions of Merging Firms, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 154, 168 (1983) (offering
empirical evidence).
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of a bidder's motivations for launching a hostile takeover, so long as
the target firm shareholders are not exploited by bidders, the imposi-
tion of regulatory constraints on the market for bank control cannot be
justified. This is particularly true in light of the evidence that, while
sure knowledge of the sources of takeover gains "still eludes us," sev-
eral studies show that the acquisition of monopolistic market power is
not a plausible explanation for takeovers. 250
Recently, it has been argued that takeovers should be regulated or
prohibited to the extent that they are a disruptive influence on local
communities and on local workers who have made significant, non-re-
coverable firm specific investments in the firms being taken over.25'
While this argument may have some merit when applied to the takeover
of certain manufacturing operations such as steel, which require a sub-
stantial amount of local industrial support, the argument makes little
sense when applied to banking. First, banks require little if any of the
unique sorts of support from specialized suppliers that large industrial
firms require. Second, according to banking industry officials involved
in mergers, rank and file employees do not lose jobs when banks
merge.25 2 And, even if employees were to lose jobs, bankers can easily
transfer the accounting and analytical skills they have developed to
other sorts of jobs, so there is little danger of loss of firm specific
human capital.
A final question about the sources of takeover gains, of particular
importance here, is the question whether takeovers simply represent a
wealth transfer from fixed claimants-such as bondholders or deposi-
tors-to shareholders. If this occurs, then a robust market for bank
control could prove more harmful than beneficial to depositors. For
example, it could be argued that placing a bank's assets in the hands of
a hostile acquirer will undesirably increase the bank's riskiness because
the acquirer will need to take greater risks in order to justify the costs
of the acquisition. Thus, it is important to examine the contention that
the premiums paid by bidders represent a redistribution from fixed
claimants to equity claimants. 253
It is implausible that such redistributions could take place over the
250. See Eckbo, Horizontal Mergers, Collusion, and Stockholder Wealth, 11 J. Fin.
Econ. 241, 268-69 (1983); Jensen, Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences, 2 J.
Econ. Persp. 21, 22-23 (1988) ("[P]revious work tells us [that] [t]akeover gains do not
come from the creation of monopoly power."); Jensen & Ruback, supra note 243, at
23-28; Stillman, Examining Antitrust Policy Towards Horizontal Mergers, 11 J. Fin.
Econ. 225, 240 (1983).
251. Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers, supra note 242, at 70-75; Singer, The
Reliance Interest in Property, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 611, 655-59 (1988).
252. Merged Banks See Cuts by Attrition, Not Layoffs, Am. Banker, March 30,
1988, at 1, 15 (industry consultants claim mergers cause layoffs, but banks themselves
say that staff cuts only accomplished through attrition and transfer).
253. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (illustrating how increases in
risk redistributes wealth from fixed claimants to equity claimants).
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long run. If a robust market for bank control were allowed to develop,
rational fixed claimants would demand assurances that the essential at-
tributes of the investment they are purchasing, particularly the risk-re-
turn trade-off, will not be altered by post-contractual behavior of the
shareholders. As such, the fixed claimants would write contracts that
constrain the ability of shareholders to increase the riskiness of the firm
ex post, and shareholders would have incentives to provide credible
assurances that they will not engage in post-contractual opportunistic
behavior in order to attract investors at reasonable interest rates.
If the changes to bank-failure policy advocated in the previous sec-
tion are not adopted, 25 4 then there exists, at least in theory, the danger
that takeovers of banks will occur solely for the purpose of transferring
wealth from the FDIC to shareholders by making the resulting bank
more risky. This danger exists because even large depositors will not
exert a mitigating influence on shareholders' risk taking proclivities if
such depositors can expect protection under current FDIC bank-failure
policy. If, however, modifications to current bank-failure policies are
implemented so that uninsured depositors face losing their deposits in
the event of an insolvency, there is little danger of a bank's being taken
over by people who only want to loot it or make it riskier, since large
depositors, acting in their role as fixed claimants, can be expected to
extract credible contractual assurances that prevent such problems
from arising.255
Consistent with this theory of the incentive structure facing fixed
claimants, several studies indicate that the gains from acquisitions do
not come at the expense of the holders of the fixed claims and senior
securities of target firms. 256 A 1977 study by Kim and McConnell
shows that the abnormal returns to nonconvertible bondholders of bid-
ding and target firms do not vary significantly from zero. 25 7 More re-
cent studies confirm these results, which strongly suggest that
takeovers do not benefit shareholders at the expense of fixed claim-
ants.2 58 These studies are particularly significant for our purposes be-
cause they indicate that the banks' fixed claimants, including
254. See supra notes 71-182 and accompanying text (discussing bank-failure poli-
ies of FDIC).
255. Contracts forbidding risky activities will constrain future as well as present
management teams. In addition, Smith and Warner report that 39.1%o of bond cove-
nants contain provisions restricting certain merger activity, and 90.87o contain restric-
tions on the issuance of additional debt. Smith & Warner, supra note 32, at 123.
256. The studies are summarized in Jarrell, Brickley & Netter, supra note 243, at
51-52.
257. Kim & McConnell, Corporate Mergers and the Co-Insurance of Corporate
Debt, 32 J. Fin. 349, 358, 362 (1977) (finding no statistically significant transfer of
wealth from bondholders to shareholders).
258. Dennis & McConnell, Corporate Mergers and Security Returns, 16 J. Fin.
Econ. 143, 161, 172, 185 (1986); Lehn & Poulson, Leveraged Buyouts: Wealth Created
or Wealth Redistributed?, in Public Policy Toward Corporate Takeovers 46 (M.
Weidenbaum & K. Chilton eds. 1988).
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depositors, the FDIC, and the FSLIC, need not be harmed by facilitat-
ing a more robust market for bank control. 259
A word of caution about drawing inferences from these studies for
banking policy is in order. Takeovers cannot impose costs on the fixed
claimants of target firms because such fixed claimants have strong in-
centives to design contractual provisions to protect themselves against
such contingencies. 260 However, current bank failure policies, by pro-
viding protection for all fixed claimants of insolvent banks, removes
those incentives. 26' As such, the proposal that bank-failure policies
should avoid subsidizing fixed claimants, 262 particularly large deposi-
tors, must also be implemented in order to insure that the market for
corporate control will function optimally.
A more difficult question is whether the current rules concerning
bank takeovers should be retained even if present bank-failure policies
are continued. Under the current regulatory system, banks can in-
crease share value at the expense of the FDIC and the FSLIC by in-
creasing the riskiness of their assets.265 As such, under the current
regulatory regime, banks that are not maximizing value for sharehold-
ers because they are maintaining a relatively safe portfolio of assets rep-
resent particularly attractive takeover targets because they can be
acquired by a new management team which will increase share value by
increasing the bank's risk exposure. Thus, in order for the market for
bank control to operate effectively, those banks subject to takeover
should be required to maintain a capital structure that contains suffi-
cient uninsured, unsecured debt-either in the form of large deposits
that are uninsured either de jure or de facto, or in the form of deben-
tures-to ensure that the new management is not going to increase
259. At first blush, it might seem unlikely that fixed claimants can protect them-
selves by contract from being oppressed by future acquirers whose identities are un-
known to them at the time the contractual devices are put in place. But bond covenants
restricting merger activities, the issuance of additional debt, and the firm's disposition of
assets restrain the actions of subsequent acquirers as well as incumbent management.
See Smith & Warner, supra note 32, at 126-29.
In addition, the free rider problems that plague the monitoring activities of fixed
claimants do not pose a particularly large problem here because these restrictions are
imposed when the firm makes its initial offering of the securities containing the restric-
tions. The investment banking community, which underwrites these debt instruments,
wants them to be marketable, and it is this community that solves the free rider problem
by making sure that the bonds contain whatever restrictions are necessary to make the
issue attractive in the secondary market. See Easterbrook, supra note 42, at 654 (when a
firm issues securities "an investment banker or similar intermediary acting as a monitor
for the collective interest" of investors will review the firm's affairs on behalf of such
investors).
260. See Smith & Warner, supra note 32, at 128-29.
261. See supra notes 71-182 and accompanying text.
262. Smith & Warner, supra note 32, at 128-29.
263. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (demonstrating effects of in-
creased riskiness on share value).
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share value simply by increasing risk.264 The current rules, which im-
pede banks from taking over other banks, should be removed.
For non-bank corporations, a significant obstacle to a properly
functioning market for corporate control is the strong incentive of tar-
get firm managers to oppose value-increasing hostile takeovers in order
to preserve theirjobs. 26 5 Indeed, the less effective a particular manage-
ment team has been, the greater its incentive to prevent a takeover. 266
B. The Legal and Regulatory Constraints
A number of state and federal laws constrain bank takeover activity
for some firms and not others. State and federal laws require that both
the acquired and the acquiring firms be commercial banks located
within the same state or geographical region.267 Many states have addi-
tional laws that restrict expansion to particular political subdivisions or
provide protection for the home offices of existing banks. 268
264. In other words, the only sensible way for the banking industry to garner the
benefits of the market for corporate control without altering current bank failure poli-
cies is to declare that banks that are the subject of hostile takeovers will be allowed to fail
and will be required to maintain a capital structure that ensures that market generated
restrictions on excessive risk taking will be put in place.
265. Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 Stan. L.
Rev. 1, 12 (1982); see also Haddock, Macey & McChesney, supra note 234, at 701-02
(describing job preservation as a reason for resistance of target managers).
266. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 231, at 1175.
267. The relevant federal statutes are 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1982) (restricting branch-
ing of national banks), and id. § 1842(d) (acquisition across state lines by bank holding
company permitted only when state law expressly authorizes).
State laws restricting bank acquisition vary. Some states prohibit acquisitions by
out-of-state firms. Other states permit acquisitions by out-of-state banks within a speci-
fied region. For example, Massachusetts permits
an out-of-state bank holding company with its principal place of business in one
of the other New England States .... which is not directly or indirectly con-
trolled by another corporation with its principal place of business located
outside of New England, may establish or acquire a Massachusetts-based bank
or bank holding company, provided that the other New England State accords
equivalent reciprocal privileges to Massachusetts banking organizations.
Northeast Bancorporation, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S.
159, 164 (1985).
268. States may restrict the interstate banking activities of national banks doing
business within their borders. Federal law prohibits interstate branching by national
banks and limits their in-state branches to those permitted state banks by state law, 12
U.S.C. § 36(c) (1982), and prohibits bank holding companies from acquiring an out-of-
state bank unless its state law expressly permits the acquisition, id. § 1842(d). As an
example of such a state law, banks in Utah could branch only in certain cities, unincor-
porated areas of other counties, or where they took over an existing bank. See First
Nat'l Bank v. Walker, 385 U.S. 252, 254 n.2 (1966). Utah has since repealed this restric-
tion. Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-708 (1988). New York permits banks to branch statewide
except in counties with less than 50,000 inhabitants where other banks have their head-
quarters. N.Y. Banking Law § 105 (McKinney 1988). Missouri prohibits banks from
operating more than one place of business for the exercise of financial services. Mo.
Ann. Stat. § 362.107 (Vernon 1988). Some states, such as Illinois, restrict branch bank-
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These statutes ostensibly were enacted in the public interest to
make banks safer and to prevent the banking industry from becoming
overly concentrated. In fact, the statutes historically have served to
cartelize the banking industry, restricting output and raising prices for
consumers. 269 But in a country with 15,000 banks, 20,000 credit
unions and 4,000 savings and loan institutions, there is no support for
the proposition that permitting bank mergers will cause the banking
industry to become overly concentrated. 270
A strong argument can be made that the regulatory system which
was once designed to benefit banks through cartelization gradually has
been transformed into a system that imposes substantial costs on
banks-and society generally through bank failures-because the sys-
tem prevents banks from taking advantage of new technology and scale
economies that permit substantial cost savings to firms capable of ex-
panding.271 As a consequence, these statutes no longer enjoy even the
partisan political support they once did and are "prime candidates for
extinction."2 72
Until recently, bank holding companies could potentially expand
into other states, even without the permission of the home state's legis-
lature, by establishing a "nonbank bank" in that state. As is now well
known, a nonbank bank is a financial intermediary that does not fall
under the technical definition of bank contained in the Bank Holding
Company Act because it does not both take deposits payable to custom-
ing even more stringently. See Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 17, para. 3406 (Smith-Hurd 1981); see
F. Mishkin, The Economics of Money, Banking and Financial Markets 182 (1986) (not-
ing those states that allow unit banking).
269. Butler & Macey, supra note 60.
270. See also Miller, Public Policy Implications of Legislation Limiting the Growth
of Interstate Banks, in Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Proceedings of a Conference
on Bank Structure and Competition 602, 609-14 (1986) (arguing that concentration
poses no threat of accumulation of political power).
271. See Scott, supra note 186, at 262-63. The huge number of banks in this coun-
try is a strong indication that whatever advantages once existed for individual banks
from restricting expansion are gone today. The monopoly rents to individual banks
from the former anticompetitive environment probably have been dissipated through
new bank charters, new credit unions and other bank substitutes, and through the local
expansion of existing bank activities wherever possible.
272. Id. Over the past five years there has been explosive growth in interstate
banking. See generally Savage, Interstate Banking Developments, 73 Fed. Reserve Bul-
letin 79 (1987) (explaining the cause of this growth). A bank holding company can ac-
quire a bank as a subsidiary if the state in which the subsidiary is located authorizes such
an acquisition. The Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1842(d) (1982), prohibits a bank holding company from acquiring a bank outside of
the state of its principal place of business unless the acquisition "is specifically author-
ized by the statute laws of the State in which such [target] bank is located, by language to
that effect and not merely by implication." This form of interstate expansion was re-
cently facilitated by~a Supreme Court decision upholding the constitutional authority of
states to permit bank holding company expansion by some state's holding companies
but not others. Northeast Bancorporation, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Re-
serve Sys., 472 U.S. 159 (1985).
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ers on demand and make commercial loans. 273 The Supreme Court
recently has endorsed an expansive interpretation of this provision as
well.2 74 Congress, however, foreclosed future use of the device in
1987.275
273. Section 2(a) of the Bank Holding Company Act defines a bank as "any institu-
tion organized under the laws of the United States .... which (1) accepts deposits that
the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand, and (2) engages in the business
of making commercial loans." 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982).
Because the Bank Holding Company Act restricts the establishment or purchase of
"banks," a "nonbank bank" could escape those restrictions. The Supreme Court re-
cently described nonbank banks as
institutions that offer services similar to those of banks but... were not under
[Federal Reserve] Board regulation because they conducted their business so
as to place themselves arguably outside the narrow definition of "bank" found
in [§ 1841(c)]. Many nonbank banks, for example, offer customers NOW (ne-
gotiable order of withdrawal) accounts which function like conventional check-
ing accounts but because of prior notice provisions do not technically give the
depositor a "legal right to withdraw on demand." 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1).
Others offer conventional checking accounts, but avoid classification as
"banks" by limiting their extension of commercial credit to the purchase of
money market instruments such as certificates of deposit and commercial
paper.
Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 363
(1986).
For a discussion of nonbank banks, see generally, 2 M. Malloy, supra note 39,
§ 8.2.5 (describing the advantages of nonbank banks and discussing the attitude of
courts and administrative agencies to the device); Schellie & Climo, Nonbank Banks:
Current Status and Opportunities, 102 Banking L.J. 4 (1985) (defining nonbank banks
and describing their advantages and prospects for the future).
274. In Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. at 361, the Federal Reserve Board sought to
regulate nonbank banks by expansively reading § 1841 (c)'s definition of what activities
constitute banking. The Court unanimously rejected the Board's attempt to ignore
Congress's specific language and define "bank" not as § 1841(c) did but rather as "an
institution that offers the functional equivalent of banking services." Id. at 373-75.
275. In the Competitive Equality Bank Act of 1987, Congress redefined § 1841(c)'s
definition of "bank" to read as follows:
(1) IN GENERAL - Except as provided in paragraph (2), the term 'bank'
means any of the following:
(A) An insured bank as defined in section 3(h) of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act.
(B) An institution organized under the laws of the United States, any
State of the United States, the District of Columbia, any territory of the
United States, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, or the Virgin Islands
which both-
(i) accepts demand deposits or deposits that the depositor may
withdraw by check or similar means for payment to third parties or
others; and
(ii) is engaged in the business of making commercial loans.
Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-86, § 101(a)(1), 101 Stat. 552,
554 (1987) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1841(c) (West Supp. 1988)).
This section of the Act "closes the nonbank bank loophole in the Bank Holding
Company Act by redefining the term 'bank' ... to include an FDIC-insured institution
whether or not it accepts demand deposits or makes commercial loans." S. Rep. No.
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The final means of geographic expansion possible for banks con-
sists of a variety of long standing miscellaneous devices such as solicit-
ing deposits by mail, establishing interstate loan production offices,
sharing automatic teller machine networks, staking out minority equity
positions in out-of-state banks, and establishing nonbanking subsidiar-
ies of bank holding companies.276
Despite the growing trend towards permitting geographic expan-
sion, the prospects for a robust market for corporate control do not
appear to be great. An additional set of regulations that deal specifi-
cally with takeovers of banks by other banks protects incumbent man-
agement of depository institutions and retards the market for corporate
control in the banking industry. It is these regulations that deprive the
market of effective monitoring of banks by outside bidders and pre-
vents inept or incumbent management teams from being replaced.
277
Three statutes control bank takeover activity. 2 78 The Bank Merger
100-19, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 29, reprinted in 1987 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
489, 519.
276. See Savage, supra note 272, at 80-82 (describing various forms of interstate
expansion adopted by the various states); see also Miller, supra note 60, at 183-85 (list-
ing mail solicitations, ATM networks, and minority shareholder positions).
277. The difficulties inherent in unfriendly bank takeovers were illustrated in 1986
in the unsuccessful attempt by First Interstate Bancorp to acquire the troubled Bank of
America. Largely because of regulatory difficulties, First Interstate was never even able
to present its terms to the shareholders of the holding company.
At present writing, the Bank of New York Co. has announced its intention to ac-
quire Irving Bank Corp. However, observers of the takeover have suggested Irving may
be able to fend off the proposed acquisition. See Snags Seen in Proposed Irving
Merger, Am. Banker, Sept. 30, 1987, at 1.
After a protracted struggle, Irving appeared to have successfully fended off the
Bank of New York's hostile bid when it defeated the Bank of New York's attempt to elect
a slate of 16 directors to Irving's board in May, 1988. See Irving Wins Proxy Battle,
Results Indicate, Am. Banker, May 17, 1988, at 1. In July, 1988, however, a court ap-
pointed referee ruled that the Bank of New York had gained a bylaw change that opened
the door to another meeting of Irving shareholders. The bylaw allows 10% of Irving
shareholders to call a special shareholders' meeting, at which a new election for direc-
tors might take place. This bylaw change gives the Bank of New York, which owns 4.9%
of Irving's outstanding shares, the opportunity to call such a special meeting and at-
tempt once again to displace the Irving board of directors. Referee Affirms Irving
Board, Amends Tally, Am. Banker, July 8, 1988, at 2.
Irving won the May election by 231,000 votes. However, 318,000 of Irving's votes
(i.e., the margin of victory) came from shareholders friendly to Irving who were issued
an "unusual" type of "poison preferred stock" which gave them 1.471 votes per pre-
ferred share. The Bank of New York is challenging the issuance of these preferred
shares. Id.
The Federal Reserve Board's approval of Bank of New York's bid is scheduled to
expire on September 7, 1988. Bank of New York has requested an extension of ninety
days. If the extension is not granted, Bank of New York will be forced to cancel its bid.
Irving Bid Nears 2d Year as Fed Mulls Extension, Am. Banker, Aug. 16, 1988, at 13.
278. In addition to these provisions, the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987
permits out of state banks or bank holding companies to acquire insured banks that are
in danger of failing provided that they meet certain size requirements. See Competitive
12151988]
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Act 279 governs mergers between banks; the Bank Holding Company
Act 28 ° governs purchases of stock in banks by bank holding companies;
and the Change in Bank Control Act 281 governs acquisitions of banks
by individuals. Together, these statutes dramatically increase the time
required for a hostile bidder to take control of any target bank. This
delay makes hostile takeovers exceedingly rare in banking for two rea-
sons. First, in the words of a client memorandum on the subject of
bank takeovers by a major New York takeover firm, "for as long as a
transaction is not closed it is, or at least is perceived to be, at the mercy
of competitive bidders or others who might, for whatever reason, have
an interest in breaking up the marriage. '282 The second obstacle to
hostile takeover bids comes in the form of market risk, a term used to
describe the risk that market conditions will change between the time of
the bid and the time regulatory approval is granted, thus negating the
benefits of the deal for one side or the other.283
With the passage of the Change in Bank Control Act in 1980, it "is
now impossible for someone to take control of a commercial bank with-
out prior regulatory approval or review."' 284 The Change in Bank Con-
trol Act prevents any person from acquiring control of an FDIC insured
bank unless the appropriate federal regulatory agency has been given
sixty days prior written notice of the proposed acquisition. 28 5 This
mandatory sixty day delay period may be extended to an even longer
Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 502(a), (b), 1987 U. S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News (101 Stat.) 552, amending §§ 13(f)(1) and 13(f)(3) of the Federal De-
posit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1823(f)(1), (3) (1982). While these new statutory pro-
visions ostensibly liberalize the powers of the FDIC to assist failing banks, see
Competitive Equality Banking Act § 502(b), the provisions do nothing to facilitate a
more robust market for bank control of failed banks for two reasons. First, the Competi-
tive Equality Banking Act permits the FDIC to assist in the acquisition of a failing bank
only if the board of trustees of the bank "has requested in writing that the Corporation
assist the acquisition or merger." 12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(f)(2)(c) (West Supp. 1988). And
mergers are only allowed under the section if the FDIC provides assistance. Id.
§ 1823(f)(1). Thus, incumbent management of failing banks can prevent acquisitions
under the new provisions simply by not requesting that the FDIC assist in the acquisi-
tion. Second, the FDIC may not take any final action with respect to any emergency
acquisition unless the state bank supervisor of the state in which the bank in danger of
closing is located approves the acquisition. Id. § 1823(f)(3)(E). This provides an addi-
tional layer of protection for incumbent management.
279. The relevant provision of the Bank Merger Act is currently codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1982).
280. The relevant provision of the Bank Holding Company Act is currently codified
as amended at id. § 1842.
281. Id. § 1817(j).
282. E. Herlihy & D. McDonald, Protective Arrangements in Bank Acquisitions:
"Lock-Ups" and "Walk-Aways" in the World After Northeast Banco"p, at 3 (undated mem-
orandum by attorneys at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen and Katz, on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
283. Id. at 5.
284. E. Symons &J. White, supra note 44, at 498.
285. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)(1) (1982).
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period by the relevant regulatory agency,286 and still longer if the
agency determines that the bidding firm has not furnished all the infor-
mation required under the statute. 287
While an agency theoretically could expedite the decision-making
process by issuing written notice of its intent not to disapprove a pro-
posed takeover, federal regulators do not have the ability to grant auto-
matic approvals of proposed takeovers by individuals because the
federal banking agency is required to provide, the appropriate state
banking agency with a copy of the bidder's notice of his proposed ac-
quisition.288 The federal regulators are required to provide the state
regulator with thirty days in which to make its views known.289
The Change in Bank Control Act requires that the acquirer pro-
vide the relevant federal banking agency with his identity and the iden-
tity of each person on whose behalf he is making the acquisition, 290
along with their financial statements for the current year and the previ-
ous five years, 29 1 the terms and conditions of the proposed acquisi-
tion, 29 2 the identity of the acquirer and the source and terms of her
funding,293 and a description of the plans the acquirer has for the tar-
get bank.2 94
These disclosure requirements track the disclosure provisions that
the Williams Act imposes on all firms, 295 which make takeovers more
costly and reduce the monitoring of potential targets by prospective
bidders by permitting other bidders to free-ride on the costly research
done by the first bidders.2 96 What makes the Change in Bank Control
Act particulary costly is its requirement that bidders disclose their iden-
tity and plans in advance of an acquisition of control. This requirement
286. Id.
287. Id. § 1817(j)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1986). The agency's extension of the time pe-
riod may not, however, "exceed 2 additional times for not more than 45 days each time
." Id. § 1817(j)(1).
288. Id. § 1817(j)(2)(A). The only exception is when the federal bank administra-
tors must act immediately to prevent a probable failure of the bank involved in the pro-
posed acquisition. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. § 1817(j)(6)(A) (1982).
291. Id. § 1817(j)(6)(B).
292. Id. § 1817(j)(6)(C).
293. Id. § 1817(j)(6)(D).
294. Id. § 1817(j)(6)(E).
295. Section 13(d) of the Williams Act requires any person who obtains a beneficial
interest of more than five percent in a company to file with the SEC. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(d)(1) (1982). Such five percent purchasers must disclose the information con-
tained in Item 4 of Schedule 13D. Securities Exchange Act, Schedule 13D, Item 4, 17
C.F.R. § 240, 13d-1, 240.13d-7 (1987). In addition, under rule 14D-l, any person who
makes a tender offer that will result in his becoming the beneficial owner of more than
five percent of any class of a company's equity securities must file a schedule 14D-1. 17
C.F.R. § 240.14d-3 (1987).
296. See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 265, at 4-7 (discussing the
adverse effects of disclosure of information in the market context).
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of advance regulatory approval of control transactions greatly facilitates
the ability of other potential bidders to free-ride on the information
generated by the initial bidder. This free-riding enables the manage-
ment of target banks to engage in defensive tactics much earlier than
would be possible in the absence of the statute. By contrast, the
Williams Act imposes no advance notice requirement. 297 Significantly,
when the Williams Act initially was introduced in the Eighty-Ninth Con-
gress, it did require disclosure twenty days in advance of a tender offer
or large block acquisition,298 but the statute eventually was reformed to
eliminate the advance disclosure requirements. 299
There are several grounds upon which the appropriate federal
banking agency may disapprove the proposed acquisition of a federally
insured bank. Not only may a takeover be disapproved if it would
lessen competition 300 or result in a monopoly, 30 1 but the regulators
also may disapprove a proposed acquisition if they do not think well of
the financial condition30 2 or management abilities of the acquirer3 03
While these latter provisions have a surface appeal, upon.reflection it is
clear that banking administrators should not disapprove proposed ac-
quisitions on the basis of the regulators' opinions of management qual-
ity or financial condition. Making an acquisition of a depository
institution requires substantial capital. Not only must the acquisition
be financed, but it must be financed in a manner that complies with
297. The Williams Act requires tender offerers to notify target firms and the SEC at
the same time they make their offer. Block purchasers who do not make tender offers
must file with the SEC within ten days of acquiring five percent of the target firm's stock.
See generally Macey & Netter, Regulation 13D and the Regulatory Process, 65 Wash.
U.L.Q. 131, 131 (1987) (discussing the provisions of the Williams Act).
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1976 does require pre-acquisition filings if the per-
sons who are parties to the transaction and the assets to be acquired are of a certain size.
15 U.S.C. § 18a (1982). Specifically, the requirement applies if one party to a transac-
tion has sales or assets of $100 million or more and the other party has sales or assets of
$10 million if engaged in manufacturing (or assets of $10 million if not engaged in man-
ufacturing), and if the acquiring person will hold 15 percent of the voting stock or assets
of the acquired person or voting stock or assets with a value in excess of $15 million. R.
Gilson, The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions 1084-85 (1986). But Hart-
Scott-Rodino imposes substantially shorter advance notification provisions for tender
offers-15 days for cash tender offers extendable by regulatory agencies to an additional
ten days-than the banking regulations discussed above. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b)(1)(B)
(1982). Unlike the banking statutes, there was considerable sensitivity to the need for
speed in consummating a tender offer. As Congressman Rodino said when the statute
was promulgated, in "cash tender offers, more so than in other mergers, the equities
include time and the danger of undue delay." 122 Cong. Rec. 30,877 (1976).
298. S. 2731, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); see also 112 Cong. Rec. 19,003 (1966)
(Memorandum of SEC and remarks of Sen. Williams).
299. See Macey & Netter, supra note 297, at 134-35.
300. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)(7)(B) (1982).
301. Id. § 1817(j)(7)(A).
302. Id. § 1817(j)(7)(C).
303. Id. § 1817(j)(7)(D).
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regular capital-adequacy guidelines.8 0 4 As such, thetypical bank acqui-
sition will not involve a large cash purchase followed by the sale of ma-
jor facets of the target firm's assets in order to finance the acquirer's
purchase. Such a transaction would likely run afoul of bank capital-
adequacy guidelines because the surviving bank would be left with an
insufficient level of equity capital. 30 5 Rather, the vast majority of bank
acquisitions involve the issuance of equity. Shareholders of the bank
being acquired will insist upon getting fair value for their shares, and
shareholders of the acquirer will demand that the acquisition not dilute
their equity interests. As a consequence, the danger that an acquirer
might jeopardize the financial stability of the target, thereby prejudic-
ing the interests of depositors, is not a realistic concern.
Similarly, regulators should not block proposed bank acquisitions
on the grounds that they doubt the competence of the acquirer. If the
acquirer is able to finance the acquisition while maintaining the capitali-
zation of the target bank, then the capital markets believe the acquirer
can adequately manage the bank. Thus, regulators should not block
proposed acquisitions because they are concerned about the manage-
ment abilities or financial condition of the acquirer so long as the target
bank will emerge from the transaction with the same or better capitali-
zation ratios as before.30 6
As mentioned above, the Change in Bank Control Act applies
whenever an individual seeks to gain control of an FDIC insured bank.
In the more likely event that a bank wants to merge with another bank,
the Bank Merger Act governs the terms of the transaction.30 7 And, if a
corporation or bank holding company wants to launch a takeover of a
bank, the Bank Holding Company Act applies.8 08
The Bank Merger Act restricts the ability of banks to launch hostile
takeovers of other banks in two ways. First, whenever an insured bank
launches a two-tier bid, in which it makes a tender offer for a control-
ling interest in another bank to be followed by a subsequent merger,
the Act applies to the merger in the second stage of the transaction. In
304. Id. § 3907 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
305. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency, Definition of Capital to be Used in Determining Capital Ade-
quacy of National and State Member Banks and Bank Holding Companies (1983),
reprinted in E. Symons &J. White, supra note 44, at 289-91 (describing bank capital
adequacy requirements); see also, Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers, supra note
242, at 41-52 (explaining why bust-up mergers result in high leverage for surviving
firm).
306. If bank failure policies are changed, as suggested above, and if the newly reor-
ganized bank were to fail, the costs would largely be shared by uninsured depositors,
equity claimants, and the FDIC. Clearly, uninsured depositors who felt that the new
venture had a low probability of success would withdraw their funds and redeploy them.
As such, the new equity claimants have a strong incentive to provide such depositors
with credible assurances that their funds will be safe.
307. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1982).
308. Id. § 1842.
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addition, the Act applies whenever a bank assumes liability to pay de-
posits of another bank, which is the case whenever a bank seeks to take
over another bank in a hostile transaction.
Like the Change in Bank Control Act, the Bank Merger Act re-
quires the prior approval of the relevant federal banking administrator
before one bank can merge or consolidate with another bank.3 09 In
addition, unless the appropriate agency decides it must act immediately
in order to prevent the probable failure of one of the banks involved in
the transaction, the acquirer must publish notice of the proposed trans-
action, prior to its approval by the relevant administrative agency, in a
newspaper of general circulation in the community where the banks in-
volved are located.310 The notice must be published "at appropriate
intervals" for thirty calendar days.311
In addition to the publication requirement, the Bank Merger Act
further requires that the relevant administrative agency notify the At-
torney General and the other two federal banking agencies of the pro-
posed transaction. The Attorney General and these administrative
agencies must report to the governing agency within thirty days on the
competitive factors involved in the transaction.31 2
And, as with the Change in Bank Control Act, no control transac-
tion will be approved if the responsible agency thinks ill of the manage-
rial expertise or financial resources of the acquiring bank.313 But,
unlike the Change in Bank Control Act, the Bank Merger Act does not
allow transactions between currently solvent banks to take place until
thirty days after regulatory approval has been granted, thus greatly in-
309. Id. § 1828(c)(l)-(2).
310. Id. § 1828(c)(3). The public-interestjustification for requiring advanced noti-
fication is not clear. Perhaps advance notification permits customers, and other banks,
to register their concern about the possible anti-competitive effects of a proposed
merger, but customers seldom are involved in the process, and competitors have such
an obvious conflict of interest in opposing the proposed merger that it is doubtful that
their input would be useful.
An additional justification for publication of banks' merger plans is that it notifies
local community groups and political organizations of proposed mergers so that they
will have the opportunity to object. Under the Community Reinvestment Act, id.
§§ 2901-2905, banks may not expand through merger or otherwise unless the merging
banks have met the credit needs of the communities they currently serve. In determin-
ing whether a bank has met community needs, the federal regulators must "assess the
institution's record of meeting the credit needs of the entire community, including low
and moderate income neighborhoods." Id. § 2903. For a useful analysis of the Com-
munity Reinvestment Act, see T. DiLorenzo, The Anti-Business Campaign of the Legal
Services Corporation 9 (Center for the Study of American Business at Washington Uni-
versity, monograph, Apr. 1988) (arguing that community activists who oppose bank
mergers under the Community Reinvestment Act are acting contrary to the public inter-
est by forcing side payments to the community groups and wasting the bank's assets).
311. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(3)(C), (c)(4) (1982). If the regulators declare that an
emergency exists, the period is reduced to ten days.
312. Id. § 1828(c)(4).
313. Id. § 1828(c)(5).
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creasing the market risk to which the acquiring firm is exposed.3 14
The Bank Holding Company Act, which governs bank acquisitions
by corporations, including bank holding companies, closely resembles
the Bank Merger Act. A corporation or bank holding company must
obtain approval of the Board to acquire more than five percent of a
bank's stock, to acquire all or substantially all of a bank's assets, or to
merge or consolidate with another bank holding company. The Fed-
eral Reserve Board has the authority to approve these transactions,3 15
but the supervising agency of the bank being acquired must also be
notified of the proposed transaction. For example, if the bank being
acquired is a state chartered bank, the Federal Reserve Board must give
the relevant state banking supervisor thirty days in which to prepare a
report on the acquisition of the bank by a corporation. If the bank be-
ing acquired is a national bank, the Comptroller must be given an op-
portunity to express his views.3 16 If the state supervisory authority or
the Comptroller disapprove of the transaction, the Board is required to
hold a hearing at which all interested parties have a reasonable oppor-
tunity to testify. In addition, further delay is built into the system be-
cause the Federal Reserve Board may not begin the hearings until ten
days after the Board has given written notice to the acquiring corpora-
tion of the decision of the disapproving authority.317
Thus, the Bank Holding Company Act grants the Federal Reserve
Board what in practical effect amounts to veto power over proposed
takeovers of banks by bank holding companies and other corporations.
The prior regulatory approval deprives bidders of any element of sur-
prise and enables the regulatory authority with the closest relationship
to the target firm to cause lengthy delays by requiring that hearings be
held. At these hearings the incumbent management of the banks being
acquired can cause even more delay by providing lengthy testimony on
the proposed takeover.
Unlike the Bank Merger Act, there is no requirement under the
Bank Holding Company Act that the Federal Reserve notify the Attor-
ney General in advance of the transaction. The absence of this notifica-
tion requirement does not expedite takeovers by corporations however.
First, the Holding Company Act, as mentioned above, contains a re-
quirement not present in the Bank Merger Act that the appropriate
state supervisory authority be notified. These state supervisory author-
ities often will be reluctant to approve these transactions when the new
corporate structure removes the surviving bank from the state's regula-
tory jurisdiction. And, while the Bank Holding Company Act does not
require prior regulatory approval of the Attorney General, the Justice
314. Id. § 1828(c)(6). This period can be shortened if needed to avert the "prob-
able failure of one of the banks involved." Id.
315. Id. § 1842(a)(1).
316. Id. § 1842(b).
317. Id.
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Department has a 30-day period after an approval in which to attack the
bank holding company acquisition in court.318
A useful contrast to the various bank merger statutes is the
Williams Act, which regulates tender offers and open market purchases
of registered or widely traded securities.3 19 The statute was rejected in
the form in which it was first introduced by Senator Williams because it
was widely thought to reflect a promanagement bias. But this statute,
even in its earliest incarnation, did not place constraints on control
transactions as severe as those imposed on banks. For example, early
versions of the Williams Act that required a five day advance filing
before the commencement of a tender offer were rejected because it
was felt that "prior review was not necessary and in some cases might
delay the offer when time was of the essence."1320 The Bank Merger Act
and the Bank Holding Company Act both require a minimum of thirty
days notice to regulators, and the Change in Bank Control Act envi-
sions an advance notice period of at least sixty days before approval of
a transaction. Once Congress enacted the Williams Act, it contained no
advance notice requirement at all in order to avoid "tipping the balance
of regulation either in favor of management or in favor of the person
making the takeover bid."'321
By contrast with the certainty of the Williams Act, bidders attempt-
ing to acquire control of a bank must await agency approval for an un-
certain period, the length of which is within the discretion of the
administrative agency. This delay increases the probability that the
proposed acquisition will lose economic value in the eyes of one party
or the other. If one of the parties is risk averse, it will demand compen-
sation for this risk. If both sides are risk averse, they will both demand
compensation, possibly negating the transaction. In addition, a fore-
warned target has greater opportunity to find a white knight who can
free-ride on the search costs already expended by the acquirer. As a
consequence, an acquirer must increase its estimate of the search costs
to reflect the probability that the search will be fruitless because of a
free-rider, successful defensive tactics, or regulatory disapproval.3 22
Under the current regulatory structure, every transfer of control of
an insured bank involves at least three regulatory authorities. By dra-
matically increasing the costs of acquiring banks, this byzantine regula-
tory structure effectively deprives prospective bidders of incentives to
engage in costly monitoring activities that serve the socially desirable
goal of identifying undervalued and mismanaged banks. The regula-
tory structure thus increases the incidence of bank failure by lowering
318. Id. § 1849(b). In cases of emergency, this period is shortened to five days. Id.
319. See generally L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation ch. 7(E) (1983)
(discussing the provisions of the Williams Act).
320. S. Rep. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967).
321. Id. at 3.
322. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 226, at 705, 711 n.32.
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the motivating influence that the prospect of hostile takeover has on
incumbent management.
The current regulatory structure governing bank takeovers also in-
creases the likelihood of bank failure by eliminating the least cost route
of exit through which poorly managed or obsolete banks can leave the
banking business. Exit under these circumstances is feasible under the
current regulatory scheme only when the incumbent management of
the troubled bank recognizes the need to have the bank's assets
redeployed. It is clear, however, that in many cases incumbent manage-
ment, for reasons of its own, will not willingly agree to a merger. In
such cases, the only way that the bank's assets will be redeployed is
through the insolvency process, which is not only far more cumber-
some, but also far more costly to third parties. 323
Furthermore, the statutes governing bank transfers of control
serve no socially desirable policy function to offset the costs in-
volved.3 24 Rather, these statutes primarily serve the interest of incum-
bent management by protecting them against displacement by hostile
takeovers.
Besides the argument that the current regulatory scheme is needed
to insure that banks are not taken over by unsavory characters, the most
often heard justification for the current regulatory structure is that it
prevents transactions between banks that lead to undue levels of eco-
nomic concentration. This argument is wholly unconvincing.3 25 No
one has suggested that monopoly problems are more acute for banks
than for other businesses or that the problems require intervention by
more than one regulatory agency.
C. Suggestion for Reform of the Market for Bank Control
United States banks are small by international standards and the
banking industry is atomistic by comparison to other countries'.
326
323. Third party claimants whose claims would have been paid in a merger but not
in an insolvency are harmed.
324. Macey, supra note 234 (discussing and refuting claims that anti-takeover stat-
utes serve such socially desirable purposes as preventing expropriation of wealth by
shareholders, protecting the jobs of local workers, and eliminating managerial preoccu-
pation with short-term profits at the expense of long-term corporate development).
325. See Jensen & Ruback, supra note 243, at 27 ("The evidence indicates that
merger gains do not come from the acquisition of market power, but rather from...
efficiencies ... available to rival firms ... ").
326. There are over 15,000 banks in the United States. C. Golembe & D. Holland,
Federal Regulation of Banking 1986-87, at 284 (1986).
In terms of assets, U.S. banks do not even appear among the top five banks in the
world, and only one U.S. bank (Citibank) ranks among the top ten banks. In terms of
total size of deposits, there are no U.S. banks among the top fifteen banks in the world.
There are only four U.S. banks (Citibank, Bank of America, Chase Manhattan Bank and
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company) among the top fifty in the world in terms of assets.
When ranked by deposits, only three U.S. banks make the top fifty in the world (Ci-
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These facts may provide additional reasons why regulators should en-
courage rather than discourage mergers of healthy banks as well as of
unhealthy banks, assuming the existence of economies of scale or scope
in banking.3 27 Because mergers are low-cost economic substitutes for
insolvency proceedings, it is particularly ironic that regulators rush to
approve mergers between healthy banks and insolvent banks, while the
regulatory structure impedes the consolidation of healthy banks at
every turn.
Bank holding companies and banks that can amass the necessary
capital ought to be permitted to launch tender offers for other banks
with a minimum of regulatory interference. First, banking regulators
ought to promulgate unambiguous and widely known standards re-
garding concentration levels for purposes of bank mergers. 328 These
standards would permit a prospective offeror to know in advance
whether its purchase is likely to be attacked under the antitrust laws.
For an industry in which regulators have the authority to block the en-
try of new competitors by refusing to grant them bank charters, it is
ironic that mergers can be turned down on competitive grounds. If a
merger truly resulted in a diminution in competition, the problem
could be remedied by passing new laws permitting more liberal expan-
sion of branch activity and by making it easier for individuals to obtain
bank charters (subject to the power of the chartering agency to reject
unqualified or unreliable applicants), thus increasing competition in the
provision of bank services.
Most important, the Comptroller, the Federal Reserve Board and
the FDIC should announce a policy of automatic approval of bank take-
over proposals so long as the acquiring bank is itself considered to be
financially stable. In all cases, the review process should be kept as
short as possible, and when feasible, kept confidential from the man-
agement of the target bank until the Williams Act requires disclosure.
The banking agencies should consider adopting a procedure simi-
lar to that which the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has
adopted in order to expedite the approval process for transfers of
broadcast licenses in the context of tender offers for corporate control.
Ordinarily an applicant for transfer of a license must follow a "long-
form" application procedure.329 In the context of tender offers for
broadcast companies, however, the FCC allows the use of a "short-
form" application for special temporary authorization to have a voting
trusteeship operate the acquired company pending receipt of long-
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form approval.330 If the short-form application is approved, the ac-
quirer may consummate the tender offer and pay for the tendered
shares even though the FCC has not granted long-form approval. Dur-
ing the interim period between approval of the short-form application
and final approval of the long-form application, the trustees control the
stock of the acquired company.
In addition, Congress should revise the bank takeover statutes to
mitigate the constraints on hostile acquisitions of banks. Indeed, there
is a strong argument that the market for control of banks should be less
constrained than the market for corporate control generally. Because
most of the fixed claimants of banks have their claims insured by the
FDIC, they have no incentive to monitor the banks themselves and so
the need for outside monitoring of banks is more acute than for other
firms. 33 ' A robust market for bank control would provide at least one
level of outside monitoring of bank management and would therefore
reduce the incidence of failure resulting from management ineptitude.
CONCLUSION
In the modem corporation there exists two principal sources of
constraints on management's activities-the market for corporate con-
trol and the wide variety of contractual provisions and incentive plans
through which shareholders and fixed claimants regulate excessive risk
taking and control managerial misfeasance.
The current regulatory scheme governing the behavior of banks
greatly reduces the efficacy of both these sets of constraints. The cur-
rent policy of waiting until a bank has officially been declared insolvent
before permitting merger activity eliminates the disciplinary effect that
the market for corporate control might have on bank management.33 2
The goal of the regulatory system should be to provide private parties
with incentives to monitor bank management and control excessive risk
taking by banks. This can be done by eliminating the provisions of the
Bank Merger Act, the Change in Bank Control Act and the Bank Hold-
ing Company Act that require prior regulatory approval of bank take-
overs and permit such transactions to be delayed by lengthy hearings.
In addition, regulatory policies concerning bank failures and brokered
deposits should be amended to recognize that some bank failures serve
important social goals and thus should be allowed to occur in such a
way that uninsured depositors face loss of their deposits. But even
when the decision is made to salvage a bank after it has become insol-
vent by merging it with another bank, uninsured depositors should in
330. 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 10:309(A) (11), at 1536 (1986).
331. See supra notes 183-221 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 71-182 and accompanying text (describing bank failure
policies).
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every case be required to bear their full pro rata share of the losses
from bank failure.
These proposed major changes to the rules governing bank take-
overs and procedures for handling insolvencies would reduce the inci-
dence of bank failures by providing a continuous source of monitoring
and discipline of bad management teams. Such monitoring would not
only reduce the high incidence of bank failures due to fraud and mis-
management, but would also reduce the incidence of failures due to
insufficient asset diversification and fluctuations in the business cycle,
as superior management teams capable of properly diversifying banks'
asset portfolios replace those teams unwilling or unable to do so.
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